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[AR law is universal but about some things it is not possible
to make a universal statement which will be correct. In those
cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but
not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case,
though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is
none the less correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the
legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of
practical affairs is of this kind from the start.... [Albout some
things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is
needed. For when the thing is indefinite, the rule also is
indefinite ....
- Aristotle'
Real dilemmas depend on various values' making autonomous,
mutually irreducible demands upon us.
2
- David Wiggins
To make such an omelette, there is surely no limit to the
number of eggs that should be broken - that was the faith of
Lenin, of Trotsky, of Mao, for all I know of Pol Pot.
- Isaiah Berlin3
INThRODUCTION
Oftentimes we find ourselves exasperated by reason's inability
definitively to answer-or more precisely our inability to reason
definitively to answers regarding-life's most pressing practical
questions.4 This vexation is felt acutely when we try to convince
1. ARBISoh,NICHOMACHEANETHICS,BookVCh. 10, 1137b12-30,inANEARisToTLE
READER (J.L. Ackrill ed., 1987).
2. David Wiggins, Incommensurability: Four Proposals,in INCOMMENSURABILITY,

INCOMPARABUILIT, AND PRACTICAL REASON 52, 64 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
3. IsAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TImBER OF HUMANnT: CHAPTERS INTHE HISTORY OF
IDEAS 15 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991).
4. Ronald Dworkin is perhaps the most articulate and persistent defender of the view
that in the legal context, at least, there is usually one distinctly "correct" answer. See
RONALD DwORKIN, LAWS EMPmE (1986); Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1, 30-32 (1978); Ronald Dworkin, Objectivityand Truth- You'd BetterBelieveIt, 25 PHIL.
& PUB.AFF. 87 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth]; see also Leo Katz,
Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1465
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others of good will and intelligence that a certain course of action
is right or best, only to find that they remain unpersuaded by our
best reasons and explanations.5 But this frustration occurs
intrapersonally as well as interpersonally. Sometimes we ourselves
remain uncertain whether our own best arguments and rationales
provide a sufficient basis for choosing one alternative over another.6
We often feel a nagging suspicion that we are choosing and acting
7
without being certain that our choices are correct or best.
(1998) (arguing that simply being uninformed is often mistaken for problems of
incommensurability).
5. See Akbil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999); Sherman J.
Clark, Literate Lawyering:An Essay on Imaginationand Persuasion,30 RUTGERS L.J. 575
(1999); Anthony T. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 677 (1999). John Rawls and Cass
Sunstein have each argued that it is possible to persuade one another even when theoretical
disagreement persists. See JOHNRAWLS,POLITICALLIBERALISM 133-72 (1993) (discussing the
idea of overlapping, consensus); CASS R. SuNsTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT 46-47 (1996) (comparing "incompletely theorized agreements" to "overlapping
consensus"); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASEATATm: JUDICIALMINIMALISMONTHE SUPREME
COURT (1999); John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 233 (1989); John Rawls, The Ideaof an OverlappingConsensus, 7 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, From Consumer Sovereignty to Cost-Benefit
Analysis: An Incompletely Theorized Agreement?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 203 (1999);
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1733 (1995)
(conceptualizing adjudication as search for "incompletely theorized agreements").
6. See Richard Craswell, Incommensurability,Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1419, 1426 (1998) (noting that utility "functions simply report the outcome or
result" of choice "without trying to report anything about the reasons that might justify that
outcome"); Richard Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter? Incommensurability and
Public Policy, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1287, 1321 (1998) (noting difficulty of producing relevant
comparison of reasons to justify choice).
7. See Ruth Chang, Comparisonand the Justificationof Choice, 146U. PL. REV. 1569,
1584-85 (1998) (discussing difficulty of justifying choices and criticizing maximization as
pragmatic policy for yielding justified choice in the face of uncertainty); Jules L. Coleman,
The Practiceof Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 15 n.3 ("To say that what I ought to
do depends on the reasons that apply to me is not to say that the justification of everything
I do is settled by reason and reason alone. There are many choices I amjustified in making
for which I cannot offer conclusory reasons. Still, reasons figure prominently in determining
what I ought to do."); John Freeman, Cognitive Dissonanceand You, 11-Dec. S.C. LAW 11
(1999). Justification in the public realm is even more difficult. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at
215-16 (arguing that justified political choice rests upon public reasons); Richard H. Pildes
& Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism,and DemocraticPolitics,90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2193 (1990) (arguing that in a
political democracy, "choices must be justified through publicly articulable and acceptable
reasons"); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the RepublicanRevival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,1544 (1988)
("Under republican approaches.. ., laws must be supported by argument and reasons ....
Political actors must justify their choices by appealing to a broader public good.").
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Nowhere should this concern us more than in the law, where the
choices and outcomes of at least some actors, notably judges and
prosecutors, matter: Ajudge decides and someone loses life, liberty,
or property.' Such uncertainty is felt acutely by first-year law
students who often feel as if they haven't a clue how ajudge is going
to decide a given case,9 but it is also felt by experts, such as
experienced observers trying to predict how the Supreme Court will
decide a particular case.'0 Such uncertainty is even-perhaps
especially-felt by judges."
8. The classic account of the inveterately violent nature of the law was articulated by
Robert Cover in Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986), reprintedin NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COvER 203 (Martha Minow et al. eds.,

1992); see also Robert M. Cover, Forward;-Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983);
E. Nathaniel Gates, JusticeStillborn:Lies, Lacunae,Incommensurability,and the Judicial
Role, 19 CARDOZOL. REV. 971 (1997); Richard K. Sherwin, Law, Violence, and IlliberalBelief,
78 GEo. L.J. 1785 (1990); Robin L. West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation: Some
Reservations About the Law-as-LiteratureMovement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203 (1987).
9. For accounts of the disorientation experienced by first-year law students, see, for
example, CHRIS GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE (1991); RIcHARD D. KAHLENBERG,
BROKEN CONTRACT. A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1992); K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE

BRAi LEBUSH: SOMELECntEsONLAWAND ITS STUDY (1930); SCOITTuRow, ONEL (1988).
10. See eg., Peter Aronson, Supreme Court'sQui Tam Case is HavingAn Impact: With
RulingMonths Off, SomeLawyersSeek to Delay Old Cases,RejectNew Ones, NATLL.J., Jan.
20, 1999, at A9 (deciding whether to pursue cases requires "predictfing] what the Supreme
Court will do-no easy task"); Peter Schmidt, Supreme Court Showdown Over Student
Speech..Do MandatoryFees at Public CollegesButtress or Trample the FirstAmendment?,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., Nov. 12, 1999, at A31, A32 (stating, in case concerning whether
mandatory fees at public colleges violate First Amendment, "El]egal analysts say the issues
raised.., make the Supreme Court's decision, and its impact, exceptionally hard to predict");
Daniel Wise, Forecastof Appellate Term Judges'Views Not Clear,N.Y. L.J., Feb. 24, 2000,
at1.
11. See BRUCEA.ACKERMAN, PRIVATEPROPERTYANDTHECONSTITUTION 8 (1977) ("I have
not encountered a single lawyer, judge, or scholar who views existing case-law [on takings]
as anything but a chaos of confused argument.

- - .");JEROME

FRANK, LAWAND THE MODERN

MIND 133-34 (1930) ([T]he hope for complete uniformity, certainty, continuity in law. . ., is
gone except to the extent that the personalities of all judges will be substantially alike, to the
extent that the judges will have substantially identical mental and emotional habits.");
Daniel J. Kornstein, The DoubleLife of Wallace Stevens: Is Law Ever the "NecessaryAngel"
of CreativeArt?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.REV. 1187,1291 (1997) (describing Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes' doubt about his choice of a legal career); Judge Karen Nelson Moore, JusticeHarry
A. Blackmun: The Model Judge, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5, 7 (1998) (arguing that Justice
Blackmun was a model judge in part because he was willing to reassess the correctness of
earlier positions); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000)
(discussing judicial choice in selecting doctrines of statutory interpretation and discussing
judicial choice in face of uncertainty); Charles Alan Wright,A ModernHamlet in the Judicial
Pantheon,93 MICH.L.REV. 1841,1844 (1995) (reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNEDHAND:
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Recent efforts to understand and evaluate the sources and nature
of the limits on our ability to reason decisively and find uniquely
correct outcomes or decisions have focused on the related concepts
of incommensurability and incomparability.' The problems of
incommensurability arise when we try to compare plural,
irreducible, and conflicting values, or choose between options that
exhibit or will result in the realization of plural, irreducible, and
conflicting values.' 3
Incommensurability has been the focus of a sophisticated and
technical debate in academic philosophy, where several books have
been devoted to the subject." Law professors have even gotten
involved in the debate; for example, the Universityof Pennsylvania
Law Review recently published a 561-page symposium on the topic
"Law and Incommensurability." 5
THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994)) ("In spite of being a modem Hamlet-or more likely,
because ofit-Learned Hand is firmly enshrined in the small group ofjudges who universally
are regarded as great.").
12. In addition to the recent collection ofessays edited by Ruth Chang and the University
of Pennsylvania Symposium on Law and Incommensurability, there have been several
noteworthy contributions to the discussion of incommensurability and incomparability. See
e.g., ELZABFTHANDERSON, VALUE INETHICSAND ECONOMICS (1993); MARTHAC.NUssEAUM,
Platoon CommensurabilityandDesire, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHYAND
LITERATURE 106 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); HENRY S.
RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONINGABOUT FINAL ENDS (1994); MICHAEL STOCxER, PLURAL
AND CONFLICTING VALUES (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is
Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 683; James Griffin, Are There
Incommensurable Values?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 39 (1977); Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed
Foundations:The PhilosophicalCritiqueof (a ParticularType of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1197, 1199-203 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurabilityand Valuation in Law,
92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994).
13. Stated simply, to maintain that two values (such as justice and mercy) are
incommensurable is to say that the values are plural, they sometimes conflict with each
other (doing justice may be incompatible with being merciful), and are not reducible to a
single common value (such as money or utility) that exhausts what is important about each.
This is an initial and imprecise explanation of the meaning of incommensurability and the
problems of incommensurability. See infra Part ll.A.1 for a more precise definition of
incommensurability.
14. See, e.g. ,JoHNBROOME,WEIGHINGGOODS: EQUALIrY, UNCERTAINTYANDTIME (1991);
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS ch. 5 (1980); JAMS GRIFFIN, VALUE
JUDGEMENT: IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS (1996); RAZ, supra note 12, at ch. 13;
RICHARDSON, supra note 12; STOCKER, supra note 12; DAVID WIGGINS, NEEDS, VALUES,
TRUTH 215-67 (1991).
15. Symposium, Law and Incommensurability,146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998) (collecting
nineteen articles and comments about the problems of incommensurability).
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In the face of this onslaught of analysis of the problems of
incommensurability, one might expect that a consensus would have
emerged as to what "incommensurability" means and what its
implications are for practical reason. 6 Although there
is
considerable overlap in usage,'7 and although some common ground
does appear to be emerging, reading the literature might give one
the feeling that this is a debate about to collapse from its own
weight.
If progress is to be made in our conceptualization and analysis of
the problems of incommensurability, the law would appear to be a
particularly promising place to focus our energies.18 This is because
the law represents a complex social enterprise involving a large
number of actors across a long period of time, where reasons of
a discordant and heterogeneous nature are marshaled and cited
in defense of particular choices or outcomes that further the
realization of some among a variety of plural and conflicting values.
It is also a social practice valuing outcomes that are correct, or at
least predictable, reasonably certain, and knowable.' 9
My goal in this Article is modest. It is to give an introduction to
the problems of incommensurability and try to explain why we
should care about them.2" I also propose to examine the law, and in
particular adjudication, as a laboratory in which to study and draw
conclusions about the problems of incommensurability.' I hope to
16. See Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability:Introduction,146 U. PA. L. REV.
1169, 1184(1998):

The topic of law and incommensurability is, as yet, a fairly new one. The
participants in the Symposium come to no consensus about the specific
implications of incommensurability for law. Indeed, they come to no consensus
about the best or most perspicuous definition of "incommensurability." But it
is clearthat incommensurability-howeverprecisely defined-is a problem that
properly engages sustained attention by legal scholars.
17. See definition of incommensurability infra Part H.A.1 and accompanying notes

discussing alternative definitions.
18. See CassR. Sunstein,IncommensurabilityandKindsofValuation:SomeApplications
in Law, in INcOMimNSURABILlT, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRAcTIcAL REASON, supranote 2,

at 234; Symposium, supra note 15, at 1169-731.
19. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. Cal. L. REV. 1175, 1179
(1989) ("It is said that one of emperor Nero's nasty practices was to post his edicts high on
the columns so that they would be harder to read and easier to transgress.").
20. See infra Parts I-HIL.
21. See infra Part IV.
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elucidate both what one can learn from the law about the nature of
the problems of incommensurability and how we can constructively
respond to those problems. I also hope to shed light on what judges
and others can learn from a deeper understanding of the problems
of incommensurability, and what the implications of those problems
might be for the way judges go about deciding cases.
Judges routinely seek to accomplish the impossible-to
commensurate incommensurable values. That they attempt to do
so with regularity says something important about the problems of
incommensurability, namely that such problems do not foreclose
reasoned deliberation and choice. But if commensurating
incommensurables really is impossible, then this tells us something
important about adjudication, namely that it must remain
somewhat tentative, open to reevaluation and reassessment, and
that judges should approach their work with an open mind,
creativity, and humility.
Part I is an introduction to the problems of incommensurability.
My purpose is to explain to those who are not familiar with the
debates about incommensurability, what incommensurability is,
and why we should be concerned about it. I suggest several reasons
to support the view that values are plural and sometimes conflict.
This leads one to conclude that the problems of incommensurability
pose real challenges to our ability to engage in practical reason,
especially our ability to make and defend our choices as correct or
best.' I also describe three types of responses to the problems of
incommensurability and suggest that an approach based upon what
Aristotle called practical wisdom is the most promising approach.'
Having provided an introduction to the problems of
incommensurability, Part II seeks to provide straightforward,
nontechnical definitions for several related and easily-confused
terms, including "incommensurability," "incomparability,"
"incompossibility," "incompatibility," "uncomputability," and
"uncertainty."24 Definitions of these terms are often extremely
technical and sometimes serve to obscure, rather than illuminate,
22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See infra Part II.A-B.
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the problems of incommensurability.2 5 A large part of the confusion
and controversy that exists in the debates over whether values are
incommensurable, and what this means for practical reason, can be
traced to the multiple, perplexing, and sometimes misguided
definitions of incommensurability that have been proposed. For
example, "incommensurability" and "incomparability" are often
treated as synonyms, which leads to unfortunate conclusions. 26 Our
ability to conduct a fruitful analysis of the limits of reason when
dealing with plural and conflicting values will be greatly enhanced
if we speak carefully about these terms.'7
In Part HI,I argue that it is possible to think rationally about,
and make reasoned choices between, options involving plural and
conflicting values. Having defined these terms, it is possible to
identify with greater clarity what I call the "problems of
incommensurability"' and several important "keys" to unlocking
these problems.
The first key to unlocking the problems of incommensurability,
built upon the effort to clearly define and differentiate between
related concepts, is the distinction between incommensurability and
incomparability.' I argue that incommensurable values and choices
that vindicate incommensurable values are ubiquitous. In contrast,
choices that are genuinely incomparable are extremely rare. When
we do not distinguish between incommensurability and
incomparability, or if the distinction is drawn poorly, the problems
30
of incommensurability can easily be misconstrued or exaggerated.
The commonplace nature of incommensurable values has
important implications for practical rationality, including the
confidence with which we can assert conclusions, the breadth of the
conclusions we can assert, the specter of regret, and the importance
of keeping an open mind characterized by an attitude of humility."'
25. See infra Part H.B and accompanying notes.
26. See id.

27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part III.B.
30. See infra Part III.A.
31. See Michael Stocker, Abstract and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict, and
Maximization,in INCODMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILT?, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra
note 2, at 196, 198-99 (arguing that the reality of incommensurable values helps us
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Conversely, I argue that incomparable values and choices that
vindicate incomparable values are very rare. This also has
important implications for practical rationality, including the
possibility of shared practical reasonableness that transcends the
differences (personal, cultural, etc.) that separate people.3 2 1 also
consider the problems of incommensurability in the context of
choices that reflect radically different values, where genuine
incomparability might arise.33
The second key to unlocking the problems of incommensurability
can be found in thinking carefully about what we are doing when
we seek to defend our judgments as "best" or "correct." 4 I suggest
that the problems of incommensurability are exaggerated by
focusing unduly on which option, among two or more, is the "best,"
all things considered (ATC). For convenience, I sometimes refer to
this as an ATO judgment. What are we asserting when we claim
that a choice is best or correct, ATC? What facts are necessary for
us to claim that a judgment is best, ATC? Under what
circumstances is it important that we justify our judgments as
being ATC?
Much pessimism about reason's ability to give reliable guidance
in situations that demand a choice among alternatives rests upon
our tendency to focus exclusively on ATC judgments, often without
first clarifying what it means to make an ATC judgment. 5
Frequently, when we are faced with a practical decision, we need to
do something other than make an ATC judgment, and that
something is often much more straightforward and simple than
making an ATC judgment. Even when an ATC judgment is called
for, ATC judgments are on a better rational footing than we may
have imagined. In adjudication, of course, often there is no getting
around the need for giving ATC judgments, decisions that result in
real-world consequences for particular people. 6 For this reason, we
should expect in the practice of adjudicative decision making to be
understand why it might be appropriate to feel regret, or compunction, even when we act in
ways that we believe to be correct).
32. See infra, Part IIA2.
33. See infra Part 11.C.
34. See infra Part I.D.
35. See infra Part I.D.
36. See infra Part IV.A.
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able to identify sophisticated and subtle mechanisms for arriving at
ATC judgments. Nevertheless, even adjudicative decisions are
usually the result of a judgment that is not of the ATC variety.
In Part IV, I suggest that the law provides a useful laboratory for
examining the problems of incommensurability, both for coming to
an understanding of the pervasiveness and troublesomeness of
incommensurable values and choices, and also with respect to the
resources that we have available to reason in meaningful and
powerful ways about values that are incommensurable.
Replacing weaker with stronger metaphors as a means for
understanding how we reason about plural and conflicting values
37
is the third key to unlocking the problems of incommensurability.
I suggest that much of our thinking about reasoning about
incommensurables rests upon insufficient metaphors. Our primary
metaphors for reasoning about values involve, on the one hand,
images of maximizing some particular value," and on the other,
images of weighing, balancing, and measuring.39 These metaphors
are both powerful and problematic. Their power lies in their
promise to provide objective and quantifiable answers to practical
choices. The problem is that these very metaphors presuppose the
commensurability of the values being weighed, balanced, and
measured. It is very difficult to make sense of how we might reason
about incommensurable values when the metaphors we are driven
to employ presuppose commensurability. The use and limits of
maximizing and weighing metaphors is also very evident injudicial
decision making and justification. The problems of
incommensurability are at the root of much of the discomfort we
feel, or should feel, with judicial maximizing and balancing
analyses.
I suggest several alternative metaphors for understanding what
is involved in reasoning about incommensurables. 0 The first is an
analysis of what is involved in perception; I discuss color perception
as an example.' A second metaphor emphasizes the idea that
37. See infra Part IV.A.

38. See infra Part IV.B.1
39. See infra Part IV.B.2.
40. See infra Part WV.C.
41. See infra Part IV.C.1.
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alternatives can be evaluated in terms of "recipes" of values, rather
than based upon a paradigm that mandates maximizing a relevant
value.42 A third metaphor was suggested by the pragmatist
philosopher C.S. Pierce, who compares "chains" of reason with
"cables" of reason.4" I argue that, when reasoning about practical
choices, it is helpful to understand the enterprise as one of
constructing a "cable" of reason, with mutually reinforcing strands,
rather than to conceptualize our task as one of constructing a
logical "chain" that is only as strong as its weakest link. A fourth
metaphor is the notion of "craft," a concept that Aristotle contrasts
with practical wisdom, but that I suggest should actually be
integrated with practical wisdom for conceptualizing adjudication.44
Each of these metaphors is present in judicial reasoning. From
adjudication we can learn much about how each of these metaphors
assists us in the task of reasoning about incommensurables.
In Part V, I conclude with a plea for good will and tolerance as we
seek to reason together and persuade each other in the public
square. Although the commonplace and widespread nature of
incommensurable values ensures that people of good will and
intelligence will disagree with each other about issues large and
small, understanding the resources of practical reasonableness that
are available should enable us to conduct our disagreements in a
manner that need not be destructive of civil public discourse.
In the end, my analysis is not an unrestrained endorsement of
reason's ability to enable us to calculate the uniquely correct choice
in all practical matters. In fact, although I believe it is usually
possible to ascertain better or worse alternatives in most practical
choice situations, it is sometimes impossible or very difficult to find
the single correct choice, especially when options are not severely
limited by circumstance. This account is meant to be an
impassioned defense of the view that reason holds a valuable place
in practical deliberation and choice, including situations involving
plural, irreducible, and conflicting values. In fact, choices involving
plural, irreducible, and conflicting values present occasions when
our powers of reason and imagination are most remarkable, most
42. See infra Part IV.C.2.
43. See infra Part IV.C.3.
44. See infra Part IV.C.5.
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fruitful, and most inspiring. It is through deliberating about these
choices that we glimpse and experience an important part of what
it means to be human.
I. SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT THE "PROBLEMS" OF
INCOMMENSURABILITY?

A- The IncommensurabilityThesis
What I call the "Incommensurability Thesis" maintains that
values are plural, sometimes conflict, and cannot always be
reconciled or simultaneously realized. Realizing one value can
sometimes only be done at the cost of sacrificing some other value.
It is for this reason that choices, as well as values, may be
incommensurable.' To some, the incommensurability of values will
be intuitively obvious. Others will question whether values really
are incommensurable; perhaps plurality and conflict are only
apparent because of our failure to adequately conceptualize or
reason about such values.
What can be said in defense of the Incommensurability Thesis?
I briefly discuss three perspectives on the question of whether
values are sometimes incommensurable. The first perspective is
Isaiah Berlin's critique of value monism; the second is a reflection
about the nature and purpose of war; and the third is an
introductory comment concerning what we might learn about
incommensurability from law and adjudication.
1. IsaiahBerlin and the Possibilityof a Final Solution
Perhaps the most moving commentary ever written regarding the
plural and conflicting nature of values is found in the final section
of Isaiah Berlin's celebrated essay, "Two Concepts of Liberty."4 To
45. It does not ultimately matter whether we focus on the incommensurability of
"values," or on the incommensurability of "choices" that are the bearers of values that are
incommensurable. The question of whether justified choice between alternatives exists
remains in either case. See Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABIITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supranote 2, at 1.
46. ISAIAH BERIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
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my mind, these half-dozen pages contain some of the most searing
ideas communicated in the twentieth century. Berlin begins this
section with an assertion that is sweeping in its scope and
devastating in its implications:
One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter
ofindividuals on the altars ofthe great historical ideals-justice
or progress or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred
mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even
liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the
freedom of society. This is the belief that somewhere, in the past
or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an
individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science,
or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a
final solution.This ancient faith rests on the conviction that all
the positive values in which men have believed must, in the
end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another.4 7
Written in the decade following the Second World War, it is
impossible to suppose that Berlin's allusion to the Nazi's monistic
"final solution" was anything less than coldly calculated. 8 But
Berlin's target was not some particular value monism, but the very
possibility of monism. In an introduction to FourEssaysOn Liberty,
written in response to various critics, Berlin assails all
"[single-minded monists, ruthless fanatics, men possessed by an
all-embracing coherent vision," for their inability to "know the
doubts and agonies of those who cannot wholly blind themselves to
49
reality."
Berlin insists that some values are not compatible. Values often
conflict, sometimes violently, and cannot all be harmonized or
reconciled. The realization of some values "may in principle make
the fulfillment of others impossible." 0 In fact, Berlin suggests, it is
the inevitability of conflict between independently desirable values
that makes freedom and choice so important:

47. Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
48. That Berlin had Hitler in mind is even more clear in a later essay. See BERLIN, supra
note 3, at 225.
49. BERLIN, supra note 46, at Iv.
50. Id. at 168.
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The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in
which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate,
and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which
must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. Indeed, it is
because this is their situation that men place such immense
value upon the freedom to choose; for if they had assurance that
in some perfect state, realizable by men on earth, no ends
pursued by them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and
agony of choice would disappear, and with it the central
importance of the freedom to choose.5
Pluralism, and with it a commitment to negative5 2 liberty, is
preferable to monism, Berlin argues, because "[i]t is truer, because
it does, at least, recognize the fact that human goals are many, not
all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one
another.""3 Berlin points out that the assumption that all values can
be graded on a single metric or scale makes the mistake of
representing "moral decision as an operation which a slide-rule
could, in principle, perform."' In other words, if all value is unitary,
if all value can be reduced to a single quantum of measurement,
then moral reasoning is simply a matter of calculation. This is not
to say that the calculations will be simple, but that the nature of
the problem is simply one of quantification.
In spite of the rhetorical force of Berlin's observations, he does
not systematically establish that values are plural, much less
incommensurable. Berlin does suggest several examples of values
that he thinks are commonly understood to conflict. "It is a
commonplace that neither political equality nor efficient
organization nor social justice is compatible with more than a
modicum of individual liberty, and certainly not with unrestricted
laissez-faire."5 This example of incompatible values is followed
immediately by others-"justice and generosity, public and private

51. Id.
52. IsaiahBerlindistinguishedpositive andnegative freedom inTwo ConceptsofLiberty,
in BERLIN, supra note 46, at 118, 121-34.
53. Id- at 171.
54. Id.
55. Id at 167.
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loyalties, the demands of genius and the claims of society, can
conflict violently with each other."56
But these and other similar examples do not necessarily prove
that values are plural and conflicting, nor do they establish that
choices will necessarily involve conflicts between plural and
conflicting values. Perhaps, for example, we only think justice and
generosity conflict because we have an inadequate conception of
one or both of these concepts, or because our imagination or
ability to synthesize these values is insufficient. The absence of
argumentation to establish that these values are really
incompatible or in conflict with each other can perhaps be explained
by Berlin's belief that the reality of such conflicts is "commonplace"
and would readily be recognized as such by his readers. Another
possible explanation is that perhaps it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to establish conclusively that values are plural. Perhaps
the plurality and conflicting nature of values that we identify as
independently important is something we "see," confirmed by
reflecting upon the important life decisions that are components of
the life of any person or community. If this is true, all Berlin can do
is ask us to open our eyes and not be wholly blind to reality."
I side with Berlin when it comes to defending the reality of plural
and conflicting values. For many of us, we need only look inward for
examples of difficult choices that involved plural and conflicting
values. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that proving that
values are plural and conflicting is notoriously difficult.
2. War and Monism
One example of the plural and conflicting nature of values,
suggested by Berlin's reference to the Nazi's mistaken belief in a
"final solution," is war. In war, one side often finds itself pitted
against an adversary who is self-consciously committed to a
monistic ideal, a supreme value or "final solution" that is used to
justify the violence and death that war necessarily inflicts. Waging
war and inflicting costs and casualties on the other side can be

56. Id.
57. See id. at lv.
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viewed as an extreme way of "persuading" one's adversaries that
they are not really monists after all.
If, for example, the Nazis were devoted to a particular noxious
brand of monism, based upon theories of racial superiority and
national destiny, then the Allies' actions can be understood as an
effort to convince the Germans that they were not so devoted to this
monistic ideal that they were willing to give up everything in
furtherance of that ideal. Some costs are too high, even in pursuit
of a self-styled utopia or "final solution." From the point of view of
an incommensurabalist, war can be seen, in part, as an effort to
convince one's adversaries that they are committed to ideals and
values, even if only self-preservation, that are sufficiently
important that they justify the abandonment of the ideals and
values that seem to justify the adversaries' commitment to waging
war. War is the ultimate exercise in persuading would-be monists
that they are not monists after all.
3. Law and Incommensurability
One of the primary themes of this Article is that in the law we
see both evidence of incommensurability of values and examples of
many of the resources we have for making and justifying decisions
inthe face of incommensurable values. Justice and mercy, efficiency
and due process, original intent and current needs are just a few of
the values that come into conflict in the law. When we consider the
problems ofincommensurability from the perspective of law, several
observations are suggested. These suggestions will be developed in
greater detail below.5" First, the problems of incommensurability
are ubiquitous. The law often seeks to weigh and balance values
that are heterogeneous and sometimes incommensurable. Second,
the problems of incommensurability in the law do not foreclose the
possibility of making choices that are rationally defensible.
Although the problems - of incommensurability are real,
incommensurable values do not stop us from making and defending
choices as correct and defensible. Indeed, the law provides a rich
variety of resources for dealing with the problems of reasoning
about incommensurables. Third, due in part to the problems of
58. See infra PartIV.
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incommensurability, answers to legal questions often must remain
somewhat tentative or contestable, subject to revision and
correction.
B. Responses to the Incommensurability Thesis
There are several foreseeable responses to the Incommensurability Thesis. Two responses, in particular, warrant mention
because they are seductive as well as misguided.
1. Two Temptations
The first temptation is to deny the premise and assert a single
monistic value that subsumes, or at least stands as a surrogate for,
all other values and, perhaps, to insist on our ability to maximize
that supreme or ultimate value.59 The second temptation is to throw
up our hands in the face of plural and conflicting values and
abandon the project of seeking a rational footing for our most
important decisions and devotions.60
The dangers of yielding to the first temptation, which we might
label "monism," are considerable. As Berlin explained:
If one really believes that such a solution is possible, then
surely no cost would be too high to obtain it: to make mankind
just and happy and creative and harmonious for ever-what
could be too high a price to pay for that? To make such an
omelette, there is surely no limit to the number of eggs that
should be broken-that was the faith of Lenin, of Trotsky, of
Mao, for all I know of Pol Pot.6
59. Charles Taylor has noted that "ufin the philosophical world, big battalions follow
views that rather deny the diversity of goods and make unity unproblematic. I am thinking
of the various forms of utilitarianism, on one hand, and the theories inspired by Kant, on the
other." Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILT, INCOMPARABILITY, AND
PRAcTIcAL REASON, supranote 2, at 170, 171.
60. In describing the temptations that arise in the face of plural and conflicting values,
I do not mean to suggest that succumbing to these temptations is inevitable or even
commonplace (at least beyond the realm of academic theorizing). Nevertheless, advocates of
viewpoints reflecting the seduction of these temptations are vocal and influential.
61. BERLIN, supranote 3, at 15.
The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things
coexist, seems to me to be not merely unattainable-that is a truism-but
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The costs of monism are indeed high, both because it is
reductionistic, seeking to shoehorn all value into a common metric,
and because it dictates a model of reason based on the notion of
maximization, which compounds the reductionistic folly.62
The danger of yielding to the second temptation, which we might
label "skepticism," is that one too easily moves to the pessimistic
conclusion that choices can never be anything more than arbitrary
expressions of ir- or a-rational preferences. Reason is replaced by
will as the "creative function of man.""3 One version of this
tendency, often inaccurately ascribed to Aristotle, is to view reason
as concerned with means only, with ends determined by our
passions, preferences, or characteristic dispositions.6 Following
Hume, we may conclude that reason is only the slave of the
passions; reason is merely instrumental, enabling us to calculate
how to accomplish our ends, which are impervious to rational
evaluation.65 Such skepticism can easily degenerate into
epistemological nihilism or romanticism. The skeptic might draw
conclusions such as the following from the observation that values
are plural and conflicting:
* Since values are incommensurable it is impossible to make
comparisons among them.
conceptually incoherent; I do not know what is meant by a harmony of this
kind. Some among the Great Goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual
truth. We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable
loss.
Id. at 13.
62. Powerfil critiques of practical choice based upon strategies of m
aximization have
been offered by John Finnis, David Wiggins, and Michael Stocker. See John Finnis,
Commensuration and Public Reason, in INcoM=ENSURABIL1TY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 2, at 215; Stocker, supra note 31, at 196; David Wiggins,
Incommensurability: Four Proposals, in INCOhMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILrY, AND
PRACTICAL REASON, supranote 2, at 52.
63. BERLIN, supranote 3, at 41.
64. See David Wiggins, Deliberationand PracticalReason, in NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH,
supranote 14, at 215-38.

65. See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerningthe Principlesof Morals, paras. 240-46, in
ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS 169 (3d ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., revised by P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press 1975).
For an account of practical reason that challenges an instrumentalist conception, see Elijah
Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in INCOMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supranote 2, at 151 (arguing that it is possible
to commensurate values that appear to be incommensurable).
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o There is no rational way to compare and choose between

plural values.
o Plurality and conflict preclude sound judgment and choice,
with the result that we must either vacillate, wallow in
indecision, or just opt for an alternative on a basis other
66
than reason.
2. A Third Alternative
Both monism and skepticism are mistaken. The primary claim of
this Article is that it is usually possible to reason meaningfully
about incommensurable values, and to make choices that are
rationally defensible between alternatives that involve plural and
conflicting values. 7 In addition, we are almost always able to
defend certain choices as better or worse than other available
alternatives. Moreover, we are able to do this through a variety of
time-tested, reason-and-experience-based problem-solving methods
or techniques that are neither obscure nor technocratic.
These approaches to practical problem solving are best
understood under the rubric of what Aristotle called practical
wisdom. He described practical wisdom as a virtue of both intellect
and character that enables one to reason well in situations that call
for choice. 6' The use of these techniques are usefully illustrated by
examining the approaches taken, and the mistakes made, by judges
deciding cases."
66. Michael Stocker opposes similar mistaken conclusions in PLURALAND CONFLICTING

VALUES, supra note 12, at 1. 1 am indebted to Stocker on a number of counts, particularly for
the manner in which he distinguishes between incomparability and incommensurability. See
infra Part III.A.
67. This is not to say that it is always possible to reason about conflicting values. I
attempt to identify what it is about some situations involving conflicting values that limits
the efficacy of reason. See infra Part IIIA
68. There are a number of excellent introductory accounts of what Aristotle means by
phronesis,or "practical wisdomL" See, e.g., J.L. ACKRILL, ARISTOTLETHE PHILOSOPHER, 138-41
(1981); W.F.R. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY (2d ed. 1980); W.D. ROss, ARISTOTLE
(1923); NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER (1989).

69. Indeed, judicial decision making is best understood as a paradigmatic example of
Aristotelean practical wisdom. For representative defenses of this view, see, for example,
ANTHoNYT. KRONMAN, THE OSTLAWYER. FAILING IDEAl OFTHE GAL PROFESSION (1993);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE (1990); Anthony Kronman, Practical
Wisdom and ProfessionalCharacter,in PHILOSOPHYAND LAW 203 (Jules Coleman & Ellen

Frankel Paul eds., 1987); Steven J. Burton, Law asPracticalReason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747
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Before analyzing the ways in which the problems of
incommensurability and the techniques for practical choice in the
face of incommensurable values are illustrated by the law, it is
helpful to set the stage in two ways. The first is an effort to define,
in an untechnical and straightforward manner, the terms
"incommensurable" and "incomparable," as well as several other
related but distinct terms. The second is to consider, in somewhat
greater detail, the problems of incommensurability that we face
when choosing how to act.
II. CLARIFYING THE PROBLEMS OF INCOMMENSURABILITY
A. Seeking Workable Definitions
One difficulty in discussions of incommensurability is that,
frequently, the term is not clearly defined, and it is often confused
with related concepts that are significantly different.7"
(1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical
Reason: Statutes, Formalism and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); Brett
Scharffs, supra note *; Vincent A. Wellman, PracticalReasoningand JudicialJustification:
Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U.COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985). As the use of legal decision
making as an illustration ofwhat it means to reason about incommensurables should make
clear, this does not mean that our reason giving will necessarily (or even usually) end all
discussion or result in conclusions that are incontestable. This should be neither surprising,
nor demoralizing, for it is evidence of a rich, creative, developing social practice that is a
tribute to human ingenuity and resourcefulness, as well as rationality.
70. What individual writers mean by terms such as "incommensurability" and
"incomparability" differs dramatically. Some writers themselves propose multiple definitions
of these concepts in an attempt to understand them from different perspectives. See, e.g.,
Wiggins, supra note 64, at 52-66.
Differentwriters mean differentthings when they speak ofincommensurability. According
to Chang, Thomas Kuhn suggests that incommensurability refers to the impossibility of
making comparisons across cultures, ways of life or conceptual schemes. See Chang, supra
note 45, at 1. Incommensurability in this sense should not be our primary concern, Chang
correctly suggests, because what incommensurabalists are concerned about is the "possibility
of evaluation for us-that is, within a conceptual scheme, way oflife, or culture." Id.
For example, Bernard Williams uses the term "incommensurable" to refer to theories or
ways of life that, while not necessarily contradictory, are mutually exclusive. For Williams,
the identifying feature of incommensurables is that they cannot be combined. See BERNARD
WILLIAMS, ETIcs AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 157 (1985). This understanding of
incommensurability is very different than that of Isaiah Berlin. Berlin suggests equality and
freedom as paradigm examples of incommensurables, but freedom and equality areunavoidably-combined in all known (and probably all conceivable) ways of life. Thus, it is
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Thus, one reason for proposing definitions of "incommensurability"
and related terms is to suggest an understanding of these terms
that is less technical and opaque than many definitions that have
been offered. Recent discussions of the problems of
incommensurability by philosophers, and philosophically
sophisticated lawyers, have not lacked for definitions." My hope
more accurate to say that the impossibility of combining two theories or ways of life reflects
incompossibility (the impossibility of living both ways oflife at once) or incompatibility (that
living one makes it more difficult to live the other), rather than incommensurability.
Others emphasize the complexity and irreducibility of values to simple unitary metrics
that purport to provide ordinal and cardinal rankings of alternatives. "Cass Sunstein urges
that certain items, like pristine beaches, love relationships, and civil rights, cannot be
precisely measured by any monetary scale, and so economic approaches to valuation such as
cost-benefit analysis are inappropriate for these goods." Chang, supra note 45, at 2. John
Finnis concludes from incommensurabalistpremises that utilitarianism and expected utility
theory are doomed to failure. See id. John Finnis, David Wiggins, and Michael Stocker each
argue that if values are incommensurable, then programs that base decision making on some
sort of value maximization must be rejected. See id.
In a manner somewhat related to my proposal, James Griffin differentiates between
incomparability and related concepts such as incompatibility, unsubstitutability,
nonadditivity, and irreplaceability ofvalues. See James Griffin, Incommensurability:What's
the Problem?, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOPARABILIY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra
note 2, at 35-38.
71. See Chang, supranote 45, at 1 ("Philosophical investigation of 'incommensurability'
is as yet in an early stage. Perhaps as a symptom of this, there is even disagreement over
what 'incommensurability' means."). Chang identifies "two main ideas that pass under the
'incommensurability' label."Id. The first"is that incommensurable items cannot be precisely
measured by a single 'scale' ofunits of value." Id This emphasis on the absence of a common
scale or metric is helpful, but obscures what is mostproblematic about comparing or choosing
among incommensurables. The problem is not just the absence of a scale, but that the
available scales do not adequately capture what is compelling about eachvalue or choice that
is being compared. I develop this idea in greater detail below, see infra Part II.B.6. The
second idea identified by Chang as passing under the incommensurability label focuses
"instead on incomparability, the idea that items cannot be compared. Joseph Raz, for
example, has used incommensurability' as synonymous with'incomparability.' Chang, supra
note 45, at 1 (citing RAZ, supra note 12, ch. 13, and Joseph Raz, Incommensurabilityand
Agency, in INCOmmENSURABILITY, INCOmPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 2,
at 110, n.1). In this Article, I argue that failing to distinguish between incommensurability
and incomparability is one of the chief reasons why discussions of incommensurability are
so confused and problematic. I argue that correctly distinguishing between
incommensurability and incomparability is the first key to dealing constructively with the
problems of incommensurability. See infra Part II.C.
David Wiggins notes that "the ideas of commensurability and incommensurability have
long since had a life of their own in moral philosophy," but notes that "itis doubtful even now
whether the language of philosophy can simply carry them along and sustain an agreed
signification for them." Wiggins, supra note 64, at 52. He notes that "explicit definition"
would be best, but notes that "so much has now been argued under their mysterious auspices

20011

THE PROBLEMS OF INCOMMENSURABILITY

1389

is to find some common ground among these definitions, and to
propose a series of definitions that are less technical and easier to
understand than other suggestions. I will propose definitions of
several important terms.
1. Incommensurability
Definition: Value A and value B are incommensurableif
(1) everything of value in A cannotbe expressed or measuredin
terms of B, (2) everything of value in B cannot be expressed or
measured in terms ofA, and (3) everything of value in A and
everything of value in B cannot be expressed or measured in
terms of some other value, C. 2
and believed in their name that not just any definitions will suffice." Id, Wiggins then
suggests a series of definitions for the concept of incommensurability. See id, at 52-66.
72. This definition is very similar to that proposed by David Wiggins who suggests that:
OptionA is commensurable with option B if and only if there is a valuational
measure of more and less, and some however complex property € that is
correlative with choice and rationally antecedent to choice and rationally
determinant ofchoice, such thatA and B can be exhaustively compared by the
said measure in respect of being more 4 and less 4; where an exhaustive
comparison in respect of 4-ness is a comparison in respect of everything that
matters about either A or B. A is incommensurable with B just if A is not
commensurable with B.
Wiggins, supra note 64, at 53. In addition to its precision, Wiggins' definition is helpful
because it focuses upon the difficulty of making "exhaustive comparisons" when plural and
conflicting values are involved. Wiggins' refinements of this definition are even more
complex. See id. at 55. Choices between claims that are incommensurable in this sense can
be expected, Wiggins explains, to leave what Bernard Williams calls a residue:
Even where you make the (in-context) right choice, something important may
be left over for which the winning option can afford no compensation in kind.
For even by the uncontroversially right choice, some legitimate claim may go
completely unsatisfied. The winning choice may not reflect all the claims-the
valid claims-of the losing choice.
Id. at 53. Cass Sunstein's proposed definition captures some of the same nuances my
definition intends to capture. See Sunstein, Incommensurablility and Kinds of Valuation.
Some Applications in Law, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL
REASON, supra note 2, at 235, 238 ("Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods
cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments
about how these goods are best characterized.").
Matthew Adler, in the introduction to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
symposium on Law and Incommensurability, defines incommensurability as "the absence of
a scale or metric." Adler, supra note 16, at 1170. Equating incommensurability with
nonmetricity is somewhat misleading, as Adler acknowledges, because "what . . .
nonmetricity involves can be fleshed out in a large number ofdifferent ways." Id. Adler notes
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Or to put it in the language of choices: Two choices are
incommensurable when everything that matters about the first
choice and everything that matters about the second choice
cannot be sufficiently expressed in terms of some shared value.
The primary implication of this definition is that the central idea
of incommensurability is irreducibility. If values can be expressed
in terms of a common value, or if everything that matters about two
competing options can be expressed in terms of a common value,
then the values or options are commensurable. An example of a
commensurable value is deciding whether to measure length in
inches or centimeters. Both inches and centimeters measure length,
which is one sort of value. A length expressed in centimeters can
also be expressed in inches without any value being lost. Each is
reducible to the other. There may be problems of precision, but
these are due to technical limitations in our ability to measure and
express with exactness. Problems of precision do not pose a

that nonmetricity may mean "that no numerical ranking of the options in the order of their
comparative worth is possible." Id. This problem is misleadingly labeled "incomparability,"
misleading, because, as I will argue in greater detail below, it is often possible to compare
two options in a variety of meaningful ways, even when we are uncertain of our ability to
render final judgments about their "comparative worth." The second thing that nonmetricity
might mean is "the failure of a particular kind of scale, such as a monetary scale or a
consequentialist scale, to track the comparative worth of options." Id. This understanding
of nonmetricity gets closer to my definition, because it seems to focus upon the problem of
values being plural and irreducible. The primary problem with various "scales" such as
monetary or utility scales is not that they cannot successfully differentiate between options,
but that the comparisons they provide may not exhaust what is important about the
competing alternatives. The third possible meaning of "nonmetricity" identified by Adler is
"the fact that a scalingprocedure... is not the best procedure by which to choose among
options." Id.
My definition departs significantly from the very influential definition of incommensurability suggested by Joseph Raz in his book, The Morality of Freedom. RAZ, supranote 12,
at 321. Raz defines incommensurables as follows: "A and B are incommensurate if it is
neither true that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value." Id. at
322. According to this definition, "commensurability" refers to the ability to measure value,
but the definition is limited to one particular value: goodness. Raz's definition of
"incommensurability" is helpful in that it identifies "incommensurability" as a term that has
to do with the measurement of value. But his definition is deficient in that it does not make
clear that incommensurability is a concept that applies to the ability to measure all values,
including, but not limited to, goodness. Raz defines "incommensurability" as equivalent with
incomparability, a move which, I argue below, sends discussions of incommensurability off
on a wrong track. See infra Part lI.B.
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conceptual challenge to our ability to evaluate commensurable
values or options.
An example of incommensurable values is length and weight.
Although both ofthese values are expressible in quantitative terms,
the values measured by each of these systems of measurement is
different. The value expressed when length is measured cannot be
reexpressed in terms of weight and vice versa. Likewise, the value
of both weight and length cannot be fully expressed by some other
value. Each is not reducible to the other.
Incommensurability is often defined as the absence of a common
metric, but this definition is problematic."3 This book and that man
may be incommensurable, but each may be weighed. Weight is a
common metric. The problem is that the metric of weight may not
be meaningful for the purposes of the comparison we want to
make. 4 Even when common metrics for comparing two values or
options are available, the values or options may nevertheless be
incommensurable.
For two options to be commensurable or comeasurable, what
makes each option worthy or appealing must be measurable in
terms of some common value or set of values. Additionally, that
common value must also exhaust those factors that make the
options choice worthy. When selecting a value as the basis for a
comparison between options, what will matter is that the value
exhausts what is important about each of the competing options, at
least for purposes of that comparison.

73. For example, in his introductory essay to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
symposium on Law and Incommensurability, Matthew Adler states, "Roughly speaking,
'incommensurability' means the absence of a scale or metric." Adler, supranote 16, at 1170.
Adler next observes that the ways in which nonmetricity can be fleshed out vary. See id.
74. One of the variations on the meaning of incommensurability identified by Adler is
more sensitive on this point. Adler observes that the incommensurability of options or
choices might mean "the failure of a particular kind of scale, such as a monetary scale or a
consequentialist scale, to track the comparative worth of options." Id. This definition comes
closer to my suggestion, which focuses on the irreducibilityofwhat is important in competing
choices to a single value or metric which can be used decisively to evaluate the relative worth
of the options. But the problems of incommensurability are not the result primarily of the
absence of a "common metric" but the insufficiency of the available common metrics to get
to the heart of, or to exhaust, what is important or compelling about competing options. For
example, we can always ask, "As between OptionA and Option B, which will cost more?," but
even ifwe are capable ofanswering that question with a degree of confidence with which we
feel comfortable, it is much more difficult to be certain that we are asking the right question.
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For example, if one is trying to choose between two potential
investments (U.S. government bonds versus an equity investment
in an Internet start-up company for example) and the only relevant
consideration is which has the greater upside potential to make
money, then the options are commensurable. They are
commensurable because there is a common metric to evaluate the
two choices (upside monetary potential), and (by hypothesis) that
metric is all that matters. Thus stipulated, the choice should be
easy; we may be able to conclude with confidence that the Internet
stock is better.
Note, however, that the hypothetical is unrealistic: usually there
will be something other than upside monetary potential that
matters (such as risk, in our example). Economic models may help
us commensurate risk and upside monetary potential into a
common metric of expected return. From the standpoint of expected
return, it may be that our two investments are equal (expected
return would suggest that we would be indifferent between a low
rate of return multiplied by a high probability and a high rate of
return multiplied by a low probability), or that one provides a
higher expected rate of return than the other.
But even this may be an unacceptable oversimplification, because
expected return may not exhaust what concerns us about these two
choices. For one thing, expected return does not place any value on
peace of mind. We may be able to quantify how important peace of
mind is in the overall equation; it may be possible to find a recipe
of values (e.g., we could weigh upside potential 40%, risk 40%, and
peace of mind 20%) that enables us to calculate values for our
respective choices. On the other hand, we may not be able to
accommodate every element that is important to us about the choice
into an economic model. At some point, we may decide that peace
of mind is so important that it cannot be traded off against upside
potential. If the important values cannot be reduced to a common
value, or recipe of values, then the choices will be incommensurable.
This is not to say that we cannot compare or reason among the
choices. But there is something important we cannot do. We will
not have access to a common metric that exhausts the value of
each of the options. As a result, our practical deliberations and
choices will be less definite than they would be if the choices were
commensurable.
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2. Incomparability
Definition:AandB are incomparableifA has nothingin common
with B that can be measuredin terms of more or less.75
75. This definition of "incomparability" departs significantly from other definitions that
have been suggested. For example, Adler maintains that "[two options are incomparable if
it is false that one option is better than the other ('better,' in light of the normative criteria
relevant for choice between the two), false that one is worse than the other, but also false
that the two are equally good." Adler, supranote 16, at 1170. This definition is problematic,
both because it focuses exclusively on determining which is "better," and because it
presupposes some relevant "normative criteria" for making an ultimate comparison. But
comparison is often possible even if we are not trying to determine "better" or "worse" and
even if we are in disagreement about what the truly important "normative criteria" might
be. In fact, it may be through making a series of comparisons that we (individually or
collectively) come to a view as to what it might mean for one option to be "better" than
another, and what the appropriate normative criteria for a particular choice might be.
Adler's definition of "incomparability" can be traced to an example Joseph Raz suggests
in The Morality ofFreedom. If I have the options of spending an afternoon walking in the
park, enjoying a glass of scotch, or enjoying a glass of port, and if the port option is better
than the scotch option, and if neither the port option nor the scotch option is better or worse
than the park option, then I have a choice between incomparables on my hands, because each
of the drink options is not better, than worse than, or equally good as the park option. See
RAZ, supranote 12, at 328; Adler, supra note 16, at 1171.
This example is etremely unhelpful in defining what it means for options to be
incomparable. The problem is that Raz's options are comparable in significant and
meaningful ways, even ifwe cannot decisively say which is "best." As between the scotch and
port, we can ask which has more alcohol?, which is sweeter?, which is more robust?, which
is more soothing?, which is more fashionable?, which would add more variety to my life?,
which did I enjoy more the last time I drank it? The list could go on. Answering each question
will result in a comparison, although our conclusions with respect to some comparisons may
be uncertain. The impossibility of comparison is not a problem; if there is a problem, it is
knowing which comparisons we should regard as decisive for our choice. Comparing these
options in these, or other ways, may help bring into focus what really is important in
deciding which option is "better," at least for me on this occasion. In comparing the drink
options with the park option, we can ask, which would be healthier, which would be more
relaxing, whichwould be more invigorating, which would be more helpful in gettingme ready
for a productive evening? As a result of making these comparisons, one might reach a
conclusion that one has considerable confidence in that there is a "better" choice, at least for
onself, in one's circumstances, on a particular day. Even ifno conclusion as to which is "best
is forthcoming, one might still illuminate the choice in interesting and thoughtful ways that
will facilitate making a choice. It may not be that the choice is "best," but it will be grounded
on reasons, reasons that can make sense to oneself, and that can even be explained to others.
Even if someone else doesn't agree that we got the choice "right,"even ifin the abstract there
is no "right" answer, they might learn something interesting about what is important to us.
For example, ifI am a recovering alcoholic, or a Mormon who is committed to living a health
code that eschews the consumption ofalcohol, comparison between these options-including
choosing which is "best--is easy and meaningful. In any event, it only confuses our
conception of "comparability" to say that a failure to be able to say definitively that one
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This definition holds for both values and choices. IfA and B have
something in common, then they can be compared in terms of

whatever it is that they have in common. Two values are
incomparable if they are valuable for completely different reasons.
Two things are incomparable if the values that are characteristic of
each thing are completely different. Choices or states of affairs are
incomparable if the values realized through the actualization of
each choice or state of affairs are completely different.
I argue below that, although incommensurable values and choices
are common, alternatives that are genuinely incomparable are
76
rare.

3. Incompossibility
Definition:A and B are incompossible if A has value and B has
value and it is possible for either A or B, but not both, to be
actualized. 7
choice is "best" suggests that the options are incomparable.
Joseph Raz has elsewhere said that "[ilacommensurability is the absence of a common
measure." Raz, supra note 71, at 110. This understanding ofincommensurability seems to
come closer to my understanding of incomparability, because when two values or choices
have nothing in common there will be no common measure to compare them However, Raz
goes on to say, "[tihe incommensurability that I will be concerned with is the
incommensurability of value: the possibility that the value oftwo items, or that the goodness
of two options is incommensurate, in that neither of them is better than the other nor are
they of equal value." Id. This explication of the meaning of incommensurability does not fit
well with my definition of "incomparability," because we may be able to compare two values
or choices even if we cannot confidently defend one as better or best.
76. One interesting question is whether opposites such as good and evil, light and dark,
and left and right are comparable. According to my definition, it would seem that they are
not comparable, for good and evil appear to have nothing in common: they are opposites.
Upon reflection, however, it is clear that good and evil do have something in common: they
are each terms for evaluating moral worth. Good and evil are each understandable only in
terms of each other; that is, without the other concept, the one concept does not make any
sense. Light and dark are related in a similar way: each is a term expressing the presence
or absence of the value light. Something similar is true for left and right: each expresses a
relational presence relative to some object.
77. This type ofconflict is considered at length in STOCKER, supranote 12, at 14; see also
F. Jackson, InternalConflicts in Desires and Morals, 22 AM. PHIL. Q., 105-14 (1985). Some
authors have characterized this type of conflict as incompatibility. James Griffin, for
example, has stated that "values, being irreducibly plural, can, and often do, exclude one
another, life sometimes forces us to sacrifice one value for another. But this is the
incompatibility ofvalues (they cannot both be realized together), not their incomparability."
Griffin, supra note 70, at 36. In my view, it is more helpful to differentiate between
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The term "incompossibility" usually refers to states of affairs,

either choices or acts. For example, your being in both New York
and Paris right now is an incompossibility; they are jointly
impossible states of affairs. But values might also be incompossible
if the realization of one necessarily makes it impossible to realize
the other. For example, honesty and tact may be incompossible, at
least in certain situations. Ways of living one's life may also be
incompossible. It is jointly impossible to live the life of a Tibetan
monk and live the life of a movie star. We can imagine a monk in
the movies, and an actor portraying a monk is commonplace, but
one person living these two lives at the same time is not possible.
These two lives are incompossible. Other states of affairs are
incompossible as a matter of definition, rather than as a matter of
practical possibility. For example, being a bachelor and being
married at the same time are incompossible as a matter of
definition.
Sometimes the source of incompossibility is temporal. My being
in Paris and New York at the same time is an incompossibility.
Sometimes incompossiblities are practical, such as being
simultaneously honest and tactful, or being simultaneously a monk
and a movie star. Other instances of incompossibility are
conceptual. For example, certain scientific theories are
incompossible; it is jointly impossible for each of them to be correct.
Overlap between these sources of incompossibility is also possible.
4. Incompatibility
Definition: A and B are incompatible if the occurrence or
realization of A undermines or decreases the likelihood of the
occurrence or realizationof B.
Incompatibility is a less Absolute sort of incompossibility and
might apply to either values or choices. Incompossibles are jointly
impossible; incompatibles pull in different directions. Certain
values are incompatible, at least in certain circumstances. For
incompossibility (the impossibility ofjoint realization) and incompatibility (values that tend
towards the impossibility of realizing each other), which I conceive as a less absolute form
of incompossibility. See infra Part II.B.4 for a definition and discussion of incompatibility.
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example, efficiency and equality often pull in different directions,
as do humility and fame.
Choices or ways of life may also be incompatible. Being a
professional football player may be incompatible with being a
concert pianist, or being a lawyer may be incompatible with being
a poet; developing the characteristics that make it possible to excel
at one of these activities may undermine your ability to excel at the
other. Being a professional football player and a concert pianist is
not, however, an incompossibility; these two activities are not
jointly impossible.7"
5. Uncomputability
Definition: A is uncomputable if it cannot be generated by an
algorithm.
Real numbers whose expansions can be generated by algorithms
are called computable numbers. The real numbers n and the square
root of two are examples of computable numbers. Something is
incomputable if it is not calculable. Mathematicians have proven
that many irrational numbers cannot be produced by any
algorithmic method. 9
In contrast with the other previously defined terms,
computability may refer to a single value, rather than the
relationship between two values. Values such as numbers may be
incomputable, as may certain mathematical relationships or
concepts. Roger Penrose points out that noncomputable sequences
may, nevertheless, be perfectly well defined. 0

78. The individual who can excel in multiple roles is often an object of respect, awe, or
wonder. It is in part the ability to juggle, balance, or integrate the various, sometimes
competing, characteristics and values that are indicative of each role, that impresses us. But
the individual who divides her time and energy between too many competing pursuits runs
the risk of failing to do any of them particularly well, or at least as well as she is capable of
doing them. One explanation for this is that various commitments and objectives are
incompatible with each other, the characteristic excellences of some activities are so different
that doing what is necessary to become better at one may actually make it more difficult to

excel at the other.
79. See ROGER PENROSE, THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND 50, 82, 107, 170 (1990).
80. See id.
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The concept of incomputability is relevant to our discussion
because many philosophers, and others, have argued that values
such as utility or pleasure are incomputable; that is, it is impossible
in principle to calculate sums or quantities of these values.8 '
Incomputability is also important because, at times, problems of
incomputabilityhave been called problems ofincornmensurability.8 2
6. Uncertainty
Definition:A state of being in doubt.
Uncertainty is the mental state of doubt.' For example, one may
be uncertain which alternative is the best option under the
circumstances. Uncertainty can also exist with respect to simple
evaluative problems. One may be uncertain as to which of two
books is heavier. This type of uncertainty does not pose a
conceptual problem, although it may pose a technical problem, if,
for example, I do not have access to a scale, or if the difference in
weight is very small and my scale is not precise enough to measure
81. Closely related to the concept of incomputability is the distinction between ordinal
rankings (rankings on a list, e.g., A is heavier than B) and cardinal rankings (precise
rankings in terms of some unity ofvalue, e.g., A is 2.131 pounds heavier than B). It may be
that we can make an ordinal comparison even if we are unable to compute precise cardinal
rankings. This will usually be the result of uncertainty, either based upon our inability to
predict the result of choices with precision, or other shortcomings in our ability to make
precise measurements (e.g., lack of a precise weighing mechanism). Some authors
distinguish incommensurability from incomparability on the grounds that
incommensurability implies the impossibility of cardinal rankings and incomparability
implies the impossibility of ordinal rankings. See Chang, supra note 45, at 2. This way of
conceptualizing the difference between incommensurability and incomparability is
misguided, because incommensurability is not primarily a problem of precision, but rather
one of exhaustion or coverage. If no ordinal rankings are possible with respect to two values
or chaices, then those values or choices will be incomparable. For a definition and discussion
ofincomparability, see supra Part IIA.A2.
82. See STOCKER, supra note 12, at 175-78.
83. For a related discussion of the relationship between incommensurability and
vagueness, see John Broome, Is IncommensurabilityVagueness?, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 2, at 67. See also Katz, supra note 4,
at 1465 (noting that apparently incomparable options may only appear so due to our
normative ignorance); Eric A. Posner, The StrategicBasis ofPrinciplesBehavior:A Critique
of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1185 (1998) (arguing difficulty in
comparingoptions is notreliable evidence oftheir incomparability since people have strategic
reasons for claiming values are incommensurable).
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the difference. Thus, sometimes uncertainty is a result of
imprecision.
But incommensurability is not simply a matter of being unable
to make precise measurements along an accepted scale (such as a
monetary scale). Even if we are able to measure choices along such
a scale, something important about at least one of the choices may
not have been given proper weight in the calculation. If so, the
problem may be that the values are incommensurable. In other
words, what is important about them cannot be reduced to a single
scale of value and, in measuring them along such a scale, something
important is left out.8 4 Problems of uncertainty are sometimes
construed as problems of incommensurability and vice versa.8"
B. Significance of the Distinctions
Distinguishing these terms is important. Often when someone
speaks of values being incommensurable, what they really mean is
that the values are either incomparable, incompatible, or
incomputable. Each of these concepts pose challenges for practical
rationality, but the challenges they pose are different.
One of the central arguments of this Article is that, although
most complex choices are incommensurable, very few are
incomparable. Additionally, incompossibles may not be
incommensurable (we can compare the alternatives of vacationing
84. Cass Sunstein makes a similar point in his essay Incommensurabilityand Kinds of
Valuation: Some Applications in Law, in INCOmmENSURABILrY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND

PRACTICAL REASON, supranote 2, at 234, where he argues that some things, such as pristine
beaches, love relationships, and civil rights, cannot be precisely measured by any monetary
scale, so economic approaches such as cost-benefit analysis are inappropriate forthese goods.
See id. at 239-42. It would be a mistake to locate problems of "precision" at the heart of the
difficulty of making such tradeoffs. We can sometimes conclude with discouraging accuracy
how much money it will take for people to betray someone they love, or to trade unspoiled
nature for a monetary payment. The problem is not that the answers are imprecise, but that
a monetary tradeoff can never account for what is truly important or valuable in a loving
relationship or an unspoiled natural vista. The problem is not so much one of precision in
measurement, as that the values in opposition are both important (e.g., conservation and
freedom), what is important about one cannot be reduced to the other, and what is important
about both cannot be reduced to a third value. See definition and discussion of
incommensurability, supra Part H.A.1.
85. Ronald Dworkin has suggested that assertions that values are incommensurable
reflect uncertainty rather than demonstrate incommensurability. See Dworkin, Objectivity
and Truth, supra note 4, at 87; see also Broome, supranote 83, at 67.
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this summer in the mountains or on the beach); that incompatibles
are not incompossible (it is not impossible to be a lawyer and a
poet); that incommensurables are not incompossible (equality and
justice coexist in single states of affairs); that incommensurables
are not incompatible (truth and justice are mutually reinforcing)
and so on.
Consider, for example, two important values: pleasure and
understanding. Are these values incommensurable? The answer is
yes. The value of pleasure is not completely comprehensible in
terms of the value understanding; part of the value of
understanding has nothing to do with pleasure; both of these values
are not fully understandable in terms of some third value. Are these
two values incomparable? The answer is no. We are all familiar
with ways in which experiences involving pleasure increase
understanding, and we all have experienced the pleasure of"
increased understanding. Yet, pleasure is not reducible to
understanding and understanding is not reducible to pleasure. Are
pleasure and understanding incompossible? The answer is no. Many
states of affairs will include elements of both understanding and
pleasure. Are pleasure and understanding incompatible? The
answer is sometimes. Studying long hours in order to gain
understanding may make it difficult to spend time doing things that
are pleasurable.
Ill. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICAL REASON

A. Problems of Incommensurability
Having defined these terms, it is possible to state the problems
of incommensurability more completely. The philosopher John
Finnis describes the central problem of incommensurability as
follows:
IThere are many basic forms of human good, all equally or
incommensurably basic and none reducible to any or all of the
others; none of them is attainable by any one choice or finite set
of choices; to commit oneself to one course of action, project,
commitment, even life-plan, is to turn one's back on perhaps
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countless other opportunities of worthwhile action, project,
commitment, life .... 86

Later, Finnis utilizes the concept of incommensurability in an
analysis of proportionalism-the ethical view that tells us to weigh
benefits and harms and choose the option that gives a better
proportion than any other option (i.e. that option which maximizes
the good over bad)."7 Proportionaism's directive is clear: make a
computation. Finnis points out that this is not just impracticable,
but senseless:
It is senseless in the way that it is senseless to try to sum up
the quantity of the size of this page, the quantity of the weight
of this book, and the quantity of the number six. At first glance,
the computation seems possible; after all, each of those
quantities is a quantity, and thus has in common with the
others the feature that, of it, one can sensibly aslc How much?
Yet, on reflection, it is clear that the different kinds of
quantity-volume, weight, and cardinal numbers are objectively
incommensurable.8
In these passages, Finnis succinctly states the problems of
incommensurability.
First, values are plural and irreducible. Where Finnis speaks of
different kinds of quantity-weight, volume, and cardinal
numbers-I would speak of different kinds of value. But Finnis'
basic point is sound: We recognize different sorts of value; these
values are quantifiable through appropriate systems of
measurement (pounds, cubic inches, Arabic numerals); systems of
measurement for a single sort of value are commensurable (inches
and centimeters are commensurable, as are pounds and kilograms);
the system of measurement appropriate for one sort of value is not
appropriate for another sort of value (inches are not an appropriate
measure of weight); and many values are not only different but are
irreducible (the value of weight cannot be expressed in terms of
length, the value of length cannot be expressed in terms of weight,
86. JoHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETmHcs 66-67 (1983).
87. See id. at 85-86.
88. Id. at 87.
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and the value of both cannot be expressed in terms of some other
value).89
Second, ifvalues are incommensurable, considerable doubt is cast
on reason's ability to adjudicate between the competing claims
made by plural and conflicting values. Reasoned deliberation about
incommensurables cannot at root be a matter of calculation, no
mater how subtle or complex. If all values can be reduced to one
ultimate value, then the demands of rationality seem clear:
maximize. This is not to say that reasoning will be simple or
straightforward, as conducting the necessary calculations may be
extremely complicated. But if values are multiple and irreducible,
then, as a conceptual matter, a strategy of maximization is not only
futile, but senseless.
Third, incommensurability is not just a problem of uncertainty or
vagueness. Ifyour ambition is to determine the best course of action
under certain circumstances, and you find it difficult to determine
whether one alternative is rationally superior to all other
alternatives, you might conclude that the source of the problem is
that the values reflected in the competing alternatives are
incommensurable. A critic of the view that values are plural and
irreducible might respond that the problem is really not one of
incommensurability, but rather uncertainty. This critic would
89. Some authors acknowledge the irreducibility ofvalues, but distance the problem of
incommensurability. For example, James Griffin notes that:
We tend to think that incommensurable values are not at all rare because a
certain sort of conflict between them is quite common. Happiness can conflict
with knowledge, mercywith justice, liberty with fraternity, and so on. And they
can conflict in a way that allows no resolution without often wrenching loss of
value. It is a fact of life that some values, by their nature, exclude others. We
can choose between them because the demands of living often mean that we
must, but the choice is not a matter of deciding which, if either, has
compensatingly more ofsome deep value than the other. Our choices can leave
us with uncompensated loss.
Griffin, supra note 70, at 36. But while Griffin sees such conflict and absence of a "deep
value" that adequately represents all that is important about a value as "undeniable," he
argues that it is "not a matter of strict incommensurability." Id. What Griffin has in mind
here seems to be quite similar to my definition of "incomparability," which refers to
situations where values or choices have nothing in common, which renders any comparison
between them impossible. I argue that situations of genuine incomparability are extremely
rare and do not pose a significant obstacle to practical rationality. See supra Parts II.B-D.
According to Griffin, incommensurability refers to situations where there is no scale
available to compare values as "greater," "less," or "equal," and arises when cardinal
rankings are not possible. See Griffin, supranote 70, at 37.
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maintain that the problem is not that there is no best alternative,
but rather that, as of yet, you are uncertain what it is. This critic
might also maintain that when we declare that values are
incommensurable, we are mistaken or confused. What we are really
doing is expressing frustration at our inability or unwillingness to
do the rational work necessary to achieve certainty. In this view,
our powers ofreason may be insufficient to determine what the best
alternative is, but this is due to our own (personal or collective)
shortcomings, rather than anything inherent in the situation. This
critic might further claim that all instances of apparent
incommensurability are, in fact, situations of uncertainty.
This critic would, however, be mistaken. Not all problems of
incommensurability are really problems of uncertainty. 0 As Finnis
points out, if you are unable to conclude which is heavier the
number six or the color red, your problem is not one of uncertainty,
but rather that the underlying values are incommensurable. 91 In
some situations, making a calculation is not just impracticable, it
is also senseless. This is not to say that it is impossible or senseless
to make judgments that claim to be correct or best. Rather, it will
be necessary to develop a conception of reason that accounts for
incommensurability, and strategies of maximization and calculation
are not up to this task.92
90. Even without the complication of incommensurability, uncertainty can create
seemingly intractable ethical conundrums. For example, ifI am clear that my goalis to select
the option that will bring me the most happiness, I may find it exceedingly difficult to choose
between available alternatives. This is in part because happiness itself is a complex value
that reflects a plurality of constituent values (e.g., pleasure, accomplishment, peace ofmind,
meaningful interpersonal relationships, etc.). Even if happiness is understood as a simple,
unitary value, uncertainty may be inescapable. The list of considerations that will make it
difficult to compute the respective implications for one's happiness of alternatives is long and
open-ended, and will include difficulties of computation, uncertainty in predicting future
contingencies, the need to estimate statistical probabilities, and the need to account for the
decisions and actions of others.
Uncertainty presents real difficulties, but those difficulties are not conceptually reducible
or identical to the problems of incommensurability.
91. See FINNIS, supranote 86, at 87-89.
92. From Finnis' explanation of the problems of incommensurabilty a number of other
insights can be gleaned. Incommensurability is a term that properly refers to values, not
things. Finnis does not assert that this book is incommensurable with this page, but that the
"size" ofthis page is incommensurable with the"weight" ofthis book. The incommensurables
are the two values, weight and size. The terms "size" and "weight" are each used to make
quantifications, and each denotes different sorts of value. It would be a mistake to say that
this book is incommensurable with this page because this book and this page do share
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What, then, are the prospects for rationality? If values may be
incommensurable, incomparable, incompossible, incompatible, or
incomputable, then what is the role of reason in practical
deliberation and choice?
B. Incommensurability and Incomparability
Perhaps the most important distinction between these terms is
the difference between incommensurability and incomparability.
Many commentators do not make much of this distinction and some
explicitly conflate these terms.9 3 Others distinguish the terms, but
define them in ways that are problematic.9 4
Many states of affairs that are incommensurable are nevertheless
comparable. Let us consider an example of incommensurables
suggested by philosopher Joseph Raz:

qualities, properties, or values in common. For example, each shares the property weight.
It is not senseless to ask the question, which weighs more, this book or this piece of paper?
The term "incommensurability" also refers to relationships between systems of
measurement. It makes sense to say that inches and centimeters are commensurable. This
is because both of these systems of measurement measure the same value, length. It also
makes sense to say that inches and pounds are incommensurable because these systems of
measurement measure different values, length and weight respectively. If we are to speak
with precision, the term "commensurability" refers to values rather than systems of value.
But since systems of value always measure some particular value, it is not difficult to
ascertain the value at issue when the term "incommensurability" is used when talking about
systems of measuring value. But, when we speak of systems of measurement being
incommensurable we are speaking derivatively, it is the values being measured that are
incommensurable.
93. JosephRazuses the terms"incommensurable" and"incomparable"interchangeably.
See RAZ, supranote 12, at 322; see also Griffin,supranote 70, at 35 ("What nearly all of us,
on reflection, mean by the 'incommensurability' of values is their 'incomparability'-that
there are values that cannot be got on any scale, that they cannot even be compared as to
'greater', 'less', or 'equal'."); Steven Lukes, Comparing the Incomparable:Trade-offs and
Sacrifices,in INCOMMENSURABIL'rY, INCONPARABHIrY, AND PRACTiCAL REASON, supranote
2, at 184 ("Following Raz, I shall say that two alternatives are incommensurable if they are
incomparable: that is, ifneither is better than nor equal to the other."). One philosopher who
does distinguish between incommensurability and incomparability is Michael Stocker,
although he draws the distinction somewhat differently. See STOCKER, supra note 12, at
175-78. Cass Sunstein also maintains that incommensurability "does not entail
incomparability," and notes that "this understanding is different from that offered by many
others." Sunstein, supranote 84, at 239.
94. See supra Part II.B.
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Let us take as our example the case of a person who has to
choose between two options. The one will irrevocably commit
him to a career in the law, the other will irrevocably commit
him to a career as a clarinettist. He is equally suited for both,
and he stands an equal chance of success in both.95
Raz asks us to assume that, although we know all this, we do not
know which option is better. "It hardly needs arguing," Raz
maintains, "that in that case they are incommensurable."9 6
Raz is correct that these options are incommensurable. Some of
the values exhibited and realizable with a career as a clarinettist
are different than the values exhibited and realizable with a career
in the law.; there is no single measure for the values associated with
being a lawyer, nor is there a single measure for the values
associated with being a clarinettist.
But it would be a mistake to say that these options are
incomparable, or immune from rational evaluation. We can compare
these options in a number of ways. Each option has values in
common with the other. We may reasonably ask questions such hs:
Which will make me happier? Which will provide more money?
Which will be a better use of my strengths and talents? Which
promises the most free time? Which will offer the better prospects
for travel? Which affords the greater prospects for fame and glory?
Which will enable me to meet more interesting people? The list of
ways in which we can make comparisons is virtually endless, and
some comparisons, if not these particular ones, will not be trivial.
Admittedly, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to give answers
with any degree of definiteness to many of these questions. Our
answers may be largely speculative, or based on calculating
statistical probabilities that are difficult to project. Thus, the role
of imagination and foresight are valued skills or character traits for
practical deliberation. It may turn out that, in spite of our best
calculations, the future being unforeseen and unpredictable, we
may be wrong in any number of ways. But we can think rationally
about the choice.9"
95. RAZ, supra note 12, at 332. Raz correctly points out that this is the sort of decision

that one should care about deeply. See id.
96. Id.
97. See Taylor, supra note 59, at 183 ("I am not saying that all conflicts are arbitrable.
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Perhaps, however, I have misconstrued the claim that these two
options are incommensurable. Consider the claim that these options
are incommensurable: becoming a clarinettist will, to the best of my
ability to calculate, result in the realization of values A, B, and C in
some quantity I can roughly estimate; becoming a lawyer will, to
the best of my ability to calculate, result in the realization of values
X, Y, and Z in some quantity I can roughly estimate; values A, B,
and C on the one hand and values X, Y, and Z on the other are
completely different and have nothing in common. Value A may
itself be a complex value, exhibiting other values, Al, A2, and A3.
But these constituent values also have nothing in common with the
values X, Y, and Z, although each of these values may also be
complex values.
Here, we have a case of two sets of values that are not only
incommensurable, but also incomparable. These two options, as
defined, have nothing in common.9" According to the foregoing
stipulations, the values realized by becoming a clarinettist are
completely different than the values realized by becoming a
99
lawyer.

At this point, as a defender of the view that very few practical
choices are incomparable, I would be forced to concede that this
maybe one such incomparable situation. ° ° If the values associated
Far from it. But our resources for arbitration are greater than they are normally supposed
to be in moral philosophy, and they lie part in our sense of our lives as a whole, the lives we
are leading.").
98. We can still say that one choice will facilitate the realization ofcertainvalues and the
other choice will facilitate the realization of other values, and this may enable us to make a
judgment about which is better, although such a judgment would rest upon a (perhaps
rationally groundless) preference for one value or set of values over others.
99. In fact, one might concede that there are some values that are shared by both
becoming a clarinettist and becoming a lawyer, and still maintain that the choices are
virtually incomparable. Each activity will, for example, have an impact upon posture; and
good posture, one might concede, is a value. But, one might maintain, these shared values
are so tangential to the true worth of either option that the similarities are trivial On this
scenario, one could thus reasonably conclude, in spite of trivial similarities, the options are
incomparable, or at least incomparable as to their most significant or defining features.
100. Even this concession must be qualified. If one choice makes attainable values A, B,
and C and another choice makes attainable values X, Y, and Z, then in one sense comparison
is not only possible, but very easy. If values A, B, and C are really important (either
objectively, or to me) and values X, Y, and Z are not important (either objectively, or to me)
then comparison is possible and choice will be easy. This is to suggest, then, that
incomparability may not even be a conceptual possibility, except among alternatives that
reflect no values at all.
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with becoming a clarinettist and the values associated with
becoming a lawyer really do have nothing in common, then it would
seem to be very difficult to make meaningful comparisons between
them, although it would still be possible to clarify the implications
of each choice. 10 '
I would argue, however, that I have conceded only the trivially
true. Whereas options that have nothing in common cannot be
compared, options that have nothing meaningful in common are
extremely rare. They are, in fact, virtually nonexistent.0 2
C. Radically Different Choices
Perhaps I will be accused, however, of trivializing the nature of
the differences that separate alternative ways of life, or difficult
practical choices among very different alternatives. Perhaps
alternatives can be compared in a variety of ways, and perhaps
some of those comparisons will be interesting, informative, or
enlightening. Maybe, however, these comparisons will not
ultimately matter. An individual trying to choose between two
radically different, incompossible ways of life might concede that
the two alternative ways of life have overlapping values, but still
maintain that the values that are truly important, or definitive, for
one kind of life may be different and incomparable with the values
that are truly important, or definitive, for another kind of life. If
this is the case, how could we ever conclude, even tentatively, that
one option is better than another? This is a difficult question, one
which must be answered if there is to be a meaningful role for
reason in adjudicating between radically different alternatives. I
will briefly sketch two preliminary lines of response to a skeptic
who claims that reason is powerless in the face of alternatives
reflecting incommensurable values.

101. It might also still be possible to defend one choice as "better," based upon a defense
of the superiority of the value or mix of values attainable through one option, which are
entirely unattainable from the other option.
102. A complimentary account of the possibility ofreasoning about incommensurables is
found in Miligram, supranote 65, at 156.
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1. The Search for Common Ground
A first line of response to the skeptic begins with an examination
of the different values exhibited by each alternative. Is it true that
different life pursuits each have identifiable, truly important, or
definitive values? Initially, it does seem that different careers, or at
least different ways of life, have different definitive values. For
example, one might say that the definitive value of medicine is
health, the definitive value of philosophy is truth, the definitive
value of politics is power, the definitive value of art is beauty, and
the definitive value of religion is salvation. Surely, however, it is
not as simple as this. Most readers, I hope, would take exception
with the "definitive" value identified for one or more of these
professions. There are several reasons for our reluctance to accept
single definitive values for life pursuits such as medicine or
religion.
First, the values important to the life of the doctor, philosopher,
politician, or artist are not unitary, but are themselves multiple,
complex, and diverse. Doctors qua doctors are, at times, concerned
with truth, with beauty, with power. These may not be a doctor's
primary concern, but they are often not trivial or unimportant ones.
Yet, these are examples of values that seem definitive of other
careers. Life does not exhibit single, unitary values.
Second, many important values overlap between different life
pursuits. Surely it is professional snobbery or narrow-mindedness
to suppose that only lawyers are concerned with justice, although
justice is undoubtedly one value that is central to the legal
profession. It would also be a mistake to suppose that salvation or
eternal life is only a concern for professional clerics.
Third, even if a certain form of life exhibits only a few truly
important, definitive, or essential values, those values, upon
scrutiny, would be so complex, rich, and multifaceted that they
would admit of comparisons to other related values. For example,
we may agree ex hypothesi that the life of a monk is devoted to
salvation and nothing else. Unless, however, we define the value of
salvation in a way that uncharitably trivializes it, we will recognize
it as complex and rich. A single-minded concern for salvation surely
exhibits other values that even those for whom salvation is a
distant, silly, or nonsensical ideal can identify with-love,
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commitment, discipline, sacrifice, truth, life, and beauty are but a
few examples. To deny this is to dismiss a form of life unfairly
because it seems at first to be alien or unfamiliar.
A proponent of incomparability might interrupt to suggest that
I have simply reiterated my earlier argument that individual ways
of life do not exhibit single, unitary values. It is true that I have
worked back to the earlier conclusion. I believe if we examine them
closely, even apparently incomparable ways oflife can be evaluated
in terms of meaningful shared values. Upon reflection, I think it
will become evident that ways of living that are rich or complex
enough to vie seriously for our allegiance will exhibit a multitude of
important, definitive, essential values; and each ofthese significant
important values are themselves complex and rich. We may not be
able to reach a conclusion, through even a thorough process of
reason and deliberation, about which alternative is best, but it is
romantic overkill to say that we cannot reason meaningfully about
even alternatives that appear to offer radically different values.
2. Alternatives to All-Things-Considered(ATC) Judgments
A second line of response to the skeptic ofreason's ability to guide
our deliberations about alternatives that reflect incommensurable
values is to question our obsession with ATC judgments. Even if we
are committed to thinking rationally about the relevant similarities
between radically different life plans-if we are committed to
thinking about the respective reasons for becoming a lawyer or a
clarinettist-this does not mean that we must seek a conclusion
that one option is "best," ATC.
When we reason about the implications or consequences of
pursuing a particular course of action, our primary objective need
not be to determine how it stacks up against all other options, ATC.
We can seek and achieve a better understanding of which values
are realizable through an energetic pursuit of a particular option.
When we think about whether to become a lawyer or a clarinettist,
perhaps our main concern should not be which is better, ATC, but
what the values are that we might reasonably expect to realize
through the successful pursuit of each ofthese options. Through our
deliberation we create not only a comparison between the two
options, but we also clarify our understanding of the set of ideals,
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opportunities, and implications characteristic of each option. The
value of such deliberation will lie, in part, in enabling us to make
a considered judgment and choice about how we want to spend our
life.
One source of the tendency to think there is some right answer
that we must, or should, be reasoning towards is associated with
the mistaken belief that all argumentation, reason, and analysis
must lead in a linear fashion towards a fixed, certain conclusion.
This paradigm of reason, borrowed from mathematics and science,
postulates that the goal of reason is convergence. But, as Stanley
Cavell has eloquently argued, the point of moral practical reasoning
need not be convergence, but may further values such as enlightenment, clarification, and taking responsibility.' 3
When we deliberate about the divergent values and goals that
can be realized by pursuing one career rather than another, we
need not make a declaration about what is right, but about who we
are or who we want to become, about what is important to us, and
about what we find worthwhile in doing. One does not necessarily
declare by becoming a clarinettist that this is the only life of value,
or even that this is the best life (the life of greatest value) for
oneself, let alone anyone else. Hopefully, by becoming a clarinettist,
one is declaring that this is a life of value, that there is an ideal
associated with this pursuit that one finds worthwhile and
inspiring. The process of thinking about important life choices often
involves not so much trying to determine what is right (even if just
for me), but also trying to determine who I am and who I hope to
become. Even if choices provide options that are genuinely
incomparable, if the values associated with each option are
completely different and have nothing in common with each other,
one can still reason about each option in turn.
D. ATC Judgments
Even if I am correct that complex options almost always exhibit
multiple values that can be evaluated and compared, and even if I
am right that we often err in thinking that reason is only of value
103. See STANLEYCAELL,THECLAIMOFREAON:WITInGENSTEIN,SKE1riCISM, MOEALITy,
AND TRAGEDY (1979).
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if it guides us reliably and conclusively to best alternatives, ATC,
I still must concede that these responses do not meet the skeptic's
objections. Sometimes what we really need are ATC judgments that
a single course of action is superior to all other available
alternatives. In such a situation, everything else might be regarded
as mental calisthenics or dilettantism. In a situation of this sort,
where compelling reasons can be marshaled on behalf of at least
two incompossible alternatives, what can reason do to help make
the best choice? Is reason helpless in the event the reasons in
support of each alternative are incommensurable?
I believe reason can provide meaningful assistance in making
even ATC judgments. To understand how, it will be helpful to
consider the metaphors we might employ to understand what is
involved in making ATC judgments. The defects of our primary
metaphors generate considerable confusion in our attempts to
understand what is involved in making ATC judgments. But there
are less familiar metaphors that are far more helpful to
understanding what is involved in reasoning about plural and
conflicting values.
IV.

A

INCOMMENSURABILITY IN THE LAW

Pluraland Conflicting Values

The plural and conflicting nature of values may be more apparent
in the law than anywhere else.'0 ' Judicial choices vindicate different
values that are independently important. It is easy to observe
situations where it is impossible simultaneously to realize all of the
values that would be promoted through one choice or another.
The law also provides a good laboratory to explore many of the
available approaches that exist for addressing the problems of
incommensurability."°5 In law, choices are necessary. Judges do not
have the luxury of engaging in endless on-the-one-hand, on-the104. See Sunstein, supranote 84, at 243-54 (citing examples from the law that suggestthe
incommensurability of value, including social differentiation, the religion clauses,
broadcasting and free speech, and environmental protection).
105. See id. at 253-54 ("An especially large task for legal theory involves an adequate
description of how choices are and should be made among incommensurable goods and an
adequate account of appropriate kinds ofvaluation.").

20011

THE PROBLEMS OF INCOMMENSURABILITY

1411

other-hand analyses. They must choose and, in so choosing, certain
values are promoted or vindicated while others are subordinated or
sacrificed. Moreover, judges are expected to provide reasons for
their choices, rooted in law, that can withstand public scrutiny. On
one level, law is a social practice committed to the necessity of
providing reasons that will be accepted by others as persuasive. It
is surely true to an extent that, as Justice Jackson said, the
Supreme Court is "not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final,"1" but surely we do not want to
cede our judicial institutions into purely political bodies where. all
that matters is counting votes. Courts are in the business of making
and defending ATC judgments. We expect judges to characterize
issues properly, identify the right criteria for deciding a case, and
then to apply those criteria correctly to the facts before them.
It may be illuminating to examine various theories of
adjudication, attitudes, or approaches to judicial choice, as
examples of various approaches or strategies for dealing with the
problems of incommensurability. One way of evaluating different
adjudicative approaches would be to examine the extent to which
the approach deals sensitively and responsibly with the problems
of incommensurability.
In the following two sections I discuss some of the primary
metaphors we use, both in the law and in other situations of
practical choice, to justify our choices as best, ATC. In Part IV.B, I
suggest that our discussion of reasoning about incommensurables
is dominated by two metaphors. The first one is the metaphor of
maximization, the second is the metaphor of weighing and
balancing. Each of these metaphors is common in the law;
maximizing and balancing strategies are perhaps the two foremost
approaches used in the rhetoric justifying judicial choices. I also
suggest that these metaphors, although useful, have significant
shortcomings in their ability to deal successfully with the problems
of incommensurability.
In Part IV.C, I identify several other metaphors used in practical
reasoning. These metaphors are also evident in the law and
justifications of judicial choices as best, ATC I suggest that these
metaphors may be more powerful and useful than the primary
106. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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metaphors of maximization and weighing and balancing that
dominate judicial discourse.
B. PrimaryMetaphorsfor ReasoningAbout Incommensurables
1. Monism and Maximization
Monism is the belief that, with respect to a particular choice or
type of choice, there is only one value that needs to be considered."'
Maximization is an almost necessary corollary of monism: if there
is only one relevant value, then it is difficult to imagine a
persuasive reason for choosing any option other than the one that
will maximize the realization of that value. 08
Monism in the law takes many forms. At the risk of oversimplification, monism is implicated any time an adjudicative
choice is reduced to a single dimension.' °9 For example, formalism
and originalism each posit a single value that should be consulted
in determining the outcome of a case. What the plain meaning of a
statute is, or what the intent of the Framers actually was, may be
difficult to discern, but if the adjudicative task is limited to a single

107. The most straightforward defense of monism is that there is only one value that
matters. But there are a number of other reasons for adopting the use of a single value. It
may be that practical choice is otherwise too imprecise and open-ended; utilizing a single
value may be a way ofsimplifying choice. It may be that the proposed value does not exhaust
the important values, but that its maximization will be a better surrogate for vindicating the
wider range of important values than axiy other available option.
For a general defense of value monism and the complete comparability of value, see
Donald Regan, Value, Comparability, and Choice, in INCOMMENSURABILTY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supranote 2, at 129 (defending the prepositions

that in the final analysis "[tihere is one and only one sort of value that matters to practical
reason," namely G.E. Moore's "good," and"[gliven any two items (objects, experiences, states
of affairs, whatever) sufficiently well specified so that it is apposite to inquire into their
(intrinsic) value in the Moorean sense, then either one is better than the other, or the two
are precisely equal in value"). For a responsive critique of maximization, see generally
Stocker, supra note 31, at 196.
108. Anumber ofissues will remain open, as the conflict between"act-utilitarianism" and
"rule-utilitarianism" illustrates. See, e.g., J.J.C. SMART, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST
9-12 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973) (distinguishing rule-utilitarianism and
act-utilitarianism and defending act-utilitarianism).
109. An adjudicative ideal may not be entirely monistic when it is recognized that certain
questions will remain unanswered by an appeal to the ideal. To fill such gaps, even a
monistic theory will need to provide an alternative basis for adjudicative choice.
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inquiry, then judging is made much simpler."n A judge need only
determine which of the available options will best realize, or
maximize, the value in question. Many other adjudicative theories
have monistic ambitions, although sometimes they are unspoken.
For example, and again at the risk of oversimplification, law and
economics seeks to vindicate the value of efficiency or some similar
value. Even theories that are often not thought of as maximizing
theories, such as law and feminism, will become monistic if they are
single-minded in looking to a certain type of value to justify
outcomes.
By now, it should be clear why the metaphor of maximization as
a justification for ATC judgments is problematic. The unsolvable
problem with maximizing strategies is that it will usually be
impossible to settle on which value should be maximized."' The
problem of nonmetricity is solved by positing a value to serve as the
appropriate metric for a choice. If the metric is accepted, debates
and disagreements (real though they certainly will be) will revolve
around issues such as whether it is possible to rank choices
according to the metric in question or whether it is possible to
assign numerical values to the differences between choices with
respect to the degree that they vindicate a particular metric's value.
The problem with monism, in general, and maximizing strategies
as a natural extension of monism, is that it simply assumes away
the problems of incommensurability." For the choice in question,
110. To say the task is simple, or straightforward, is not to say that it is easy. Attempting
to figure out what the original intent is, especially of old, general, and ambitious language,
can be very difficult. For example, in the interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, originalist scholars have found considerable evidence in favor of both a
separationist and an accommodationist reading.
111. See Wiggins, supra note 62, at 62.
Somehow, despite the intractability and uncertainty of the subject matter of
choice, agents do arrive at judgments about what is worthwhile or what can or
cannot be done in pursuit of what. And somehow, from out of all this, they
arrive at shared, partly inexplicit norms of reasonableness-and they set
standards, not fully verbalized, by which people of good sense and good
character can live. If these norms are only misdescribed when they are seen as
norms of maximization, then the thing philosophy had best do is to desist
altogether from the attempt to identify that which is to be maximized. It must
attend instead to the various ideas that give the however essentially
contestable content of reasonable agents' conceptions of the good.
Id.
112. See Taylor, supranote 59, at 178 ("If our model is the possession of some metric for
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a single value is posited as the only value that has decisive force
with respect to that choice."' In some instances, this is perfectly
appropriate (e.g., which is the fastest route to grandma's house?),
but in other instances we will be left with nagging doubts about the
outcomes generated, because those outcomes do not take into
account some-perhaps much-of what we find to be important
about the choice.""
This is not to say that ATC judgments cannot be made and
justified based upon a monistic maximizing strategy. For example,
if we are trying to conclude which among several objects is heaviest,
ATC, then a monistic maximizing strategy is indicated. Of course,
nothing is added in the above example by adding the qualifier,
"ATC." In most situations, agreement about the appropriate value
to maximize will be impossible, because there is no value that
subsumes all other values that are important to complex choices.
Maximands such as happiness or utility take for granted the
commensurability of value. In short, maximizing theories deal with
the problems of incommensurability by assuming them away. 115
actions, such as utilitarians claim to have, we will give up in despair. But if we turn to the
way in which we articulate relative importance in our lives, we will see that we are not
without resources.").
113. For a critique of making a certain good preeminent as a strategy for facilitating
practical reason, see id. at 176 (arguing that "systematic priority leads to pragmatic
absurdity").
114. See Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1215,
1215-17 (1998) (arguing that when we deem options commensurable by a particular scale
(such as dollars), we may be inclined to undervalue considerations (such as the preservation
of life, the environment, or endangered species) that are difficult to measure on that scale).
115. In response to maximizing strategies such as rational choice theory, David Wiggins
has responded:
[Ilnsofar as the commensurabilist cum maximizing account ofindividual choice
is not deprived of all empirical content and all explanatory or predictive interest
(a privation that can easily escape notice in the postpositivist or postlogical
empiricist phase ofsocialtheorizing), no reason whatsoever has ever been given
to believe it-neitherinthe shape oftelling conceptual considerations (for these
would depend on the demonstration, still lacking, that maximizing model
furnishes the best way of characterizing a person's practical outlook or his
springs of action) nor yet in the shape of empirical evidence. Indeed, in actual
cases where a predictive or empirical theory is really needed and entrepreneurs
also have something to lose by getting things wrong (e.g., in connection with the
concern to make money by selling things that might be retailed at a profit),
what we observe in the real world (or so I have been told by those who inhabit
that part of it) is that nobody seriously proposes to make any distinctive use at
all of rational choice theory or its modes of characterization of the springs of
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Legal reasoning illustrates the limitations of maximizing
strategies. In the context of statutory interpretation, for example,
multiple reasons are almost always relevant. Plural and conflicting
values will include text (e.g., plain meaning), intent (e.g., legislative
history), purpose (e.g., goals sought or the mischief addressed),
history (e.g., the context of the statute), structure (e.g., other
provisions in the statute), other statutes (e.g, especially those
involving the same subject matter or similar definitions), common
law and other precedent (prior judicial decisions), background
interpretive principles (canons of construction), settled expectations
(e.g., longstanding interpretations), expert opinion (e.g., academic
commentary), agency interpretations and rules, public values
(constitutional or otherwise), and so on. There may be no definitive
hierarchy among these values, although the reasons supporting one
type of consideration will be more compelling in many contexts than
the reasons supporting other considerations. Thus, for example, in
a statutory case, textualist arguments will have great force in a
context where the meaning of the text is clear, whereas arguments
about intent or structure may have more force in a context in which
a clear textual answer is not apparent.
Maximizing strategies are always suspect, although they may be
justified. They are suspect because we anticipate that more than
one value is at stake and the maximand does not adequately
capture the range of plural and conflicting values that we deem
important. A maximizing strategy may be justified when, with
respect to a particular (or type of) choice, a single value is an
appropriate maxim and, either because it sufficiently encompasses
the values that are important to that choice, or because it stands as
a reliable surrogate for those values.

action. In practice, the thing that is always deployed in the world of commerce
is empirical phenomenology-or market research, to give it a more familiar
name. This last is a modest, useful business, but it stands in no more need of
the supposition that individual choices and the constraints on choices derive
from the chooser's striving after a maximum than does advertising or any other
method of persuasion on whose behalf market research can spy out the ground.

Wiggins, supra note 64, at 63 (citations omitted).
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2. Weighing and Balancing
The metaphor most often employed for understanding how we
reason about complex practical choices involves images of weighing
or balancing. We often hear someone say, "After weighing all the
evidence, I think x is the best available choice." The problem with
balancing metaphors is that they slip commensurability in through
the back door. If values are incommensurable, they cannot
successfully be weighed against each other. Weighing is a form of
measurement that presupposes a common unit of measure. As John
Finnis notes, efforts to weigh or balance incommensurables are
senseless, "in the way that it is senseless to try to sum up the
quantity of the size of [a piece of paper], the quantity of the weight
of [a] book, and the quantity of the number six. " n 6 Even complex
and ingenuous weight metaphors do not escape this problem.
Michael Stocker has attempted to salvage weighing and
balancing metaphors from such objections. Balancing plural values
cannot be done, Stocker explains, "by a simple hinged beam balance
or a sliding beam balance," for two reasons."1 First, "[wie are
concerned not only with the correct ratios among opposing
elements-which a beam balance would show-but also with each
of these elements being in its own proper place."" Second, "the
elements that must be balanced may well not be on a single
continuum, but rather may be more orthogonally related." 9
Stocker suggests that a solution to these problems lies in a
balance that allows for many elements, each of which "can tip the
balance pan in a different direction. Something like a pan
suspended on a cord through its centre may do. Even this may be
too simple. Perhaps we will need a sphere or a still higherdimensioned object suspended at its centre."'2 Such a balance pan
goes beyond a simple, hinged balance because not only can
something heavy placed near the center of the pan be balanced by
something lighter further from the center, but also a single weight
at the same point can be balanced by an array of weights in
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

FINNIS, supranote 86, at 87.
STOCKER, supra note 12, at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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appropriate locations on the other side of the diameter. 1 The
complexities associated with a three dimensional balance would be
even greater. Stocker claims that, unlike a simple hinged balance,
"[olur pan is a device for comparing incommensurable values."2
The problem with even this ingenuous metaphor is that all values
still must be translated into a common currency, namely weight.
The balance pan may help us understand how the utility of one
activity can be weighed against other utilities, but it does not help
us if there are activities whose value cannot be translated into the
coin of utility. The nontranslatability or nonreducibility of values
into the coin of other values is at the heart of the incommensurability problem. Incommensurables are incommensurable
precisely because they cannot be translated into a common measure
of value. Liberty and equality are incommensurable because neither
of these values is reducible to the other, and the value of neither
can be wholly expressed in terms of some other value such as
utility. Metaphors of weighing and balancing are not inadequate
because we have insufficiently complex conceptions of weighing, but
because weighing presupposes that the values at issue can be
reduced to a single unit of measure.
C. Alternate Metaphorsfor ReasoningAbout Incommensurables
1. Perception
Perception may provide a more illuminating metaphor for
reasoning about plural and conflicting values than balancing.
Consider the perception of color. The colors red, yellow, and blue are
primary colors. These colors are incommensurable. These three
colors are also incomparable. Red has nothing of either yellow or
blue in it; yellow has nothing of blue or red; and blue has nothing
of either red or yellow. These three colors are called primary
because they are irreducible to each other, and because from these
three colors, together with white (the theoretical absence of all
121. See id.
122. 1& at 149. Stocker continues, "And the comparability of incommensurables also
seems to ensure the impossibility of an algorithm for discerning the best or even a good mix
ofvalues. Thus, we see the need for practical wisdom and why practical wisdom ineliminably
involves judgment." Id. at 149.
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color) and black (the theoretical presence of all color), it is possible
to create every other color. For example, the secondary color green
is a combination of yellow and blue; purple is a combination of blue
and red; and orange is a combination of red and yellow.
Most colors that we encounter are, of course, combinations of the
primary colors. Thus, we are able to make comparisons between
them. We say, for example, that this green is bluer than that green,
or this orange is redder than that one. We also make comparisons
based upon whether a color is dark or light.
Just as most colors are complex combinations of other colors, I
contend that most practical situations exhibit a variety of different
values. Thus, when we evaluate situations involving alternatives
that reflect plural and conflicting values, we can similarly evaluate
those situations in terms of the component values.
There is another sense in which an analogy to the perception of
color illuminates our consideration of plural and conflicting values.
Color perception is a complex phenomenon involving three factors.
The first factor is the perceiver. The human eye and brain have
certain characteristics that enable us to perceive color as we do.
When the apparatus of the eye or brain is defective, color perception
is altered or impeded. The second factor is the object that is being
perceived. The object itself partially determines our perception of
it. The third factor is external conditions, most notably the presence
and frequency of light. Our judgments about colors will be affected
when any one of these three factors is varied. The perception of
color is, thus, at once anthropocentric, objective, and relativeanthropocentric because our perception of a fire truck as red
depends upon our own peculiar sensory apparatus; objective
because, for example, redness may be an external, monadic
property of a fire truck; and relative because the perception will
vary according to the frequency and presence of light.'
The analogy to color perception is relevant to practical
deliberation because this activity is also a combination of similar
factors. Our practical judgments are anthropocentric. For example,
when I think you are brave, it is partially due to my own particular
123. Thus understood, the dichotomy often drawn between objectivity and relativity is
false; a perception and, I will argue, a practical judgment can at once be objective and
relative.
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views about what constitutes bravery. In addition, the object that
is being evaluated will partially determine our perception of it. My
conclusion that you are brave will be partially due to who you are
and your behavior. We view things as valuable partially because of
the way we are and partially because of the way they are. As
philosopher David Wiggins points out, "[w]e can desire X] because
it seems good and [X] seems good because we desire it."' 4 External
conditions also affect our understanding of the value in a certain
activity. For example, the presence of a monetary incentive for your
behavior may affect my evaluation of your bravery.
When we make judgments, our thought process is often more
akin to an evaluation about color than an evaluation about which
of two things is heavier. The color metaphor does not encourage us
to make false commensurations. It also helps us recognize the
anthropocentricity, objectivity, and relativity of value judgments.
Color perception, however, is not a perfect analogy for reasoning
about incommensurables. Perception is different than reason. There
is nothing akin to rules of formal and informal logic relating to color
perception. If anything, perception seems more akin to intuition
than to reason. The similarity between perception and intuition
actually illuminates color perception as a metaphor for reasoning
about incommensurables.
Upon closer examination, we may conclude that intuition plays
a significant role in reasoning about incommensurables, a role that
is analogous to the role perception plays in our experience and
evaluation of colors. Of course, this is not to say that reasoning
about incommensurables is simply a matter of intuition. After all,
evaluating color is not purely a matter of perception.
Many philosophers have identified an important role for intuition
in moral thinking. For example, some philosophers have spoken
about moral insight, the ability to understand or perceive the
morally correct course of action in a way that cannot be explained
by adherence to a particular theory or set of rules. Intuition, as I
am using the term, is not just a pre-rational hunch, nor is it
divorced from reason. Intuitions differ from person to person, based
in part upon factors such as experience, character, imagination, and
124. DavidWiggins,DeliberationandPracticalReason,
inESSAYSONARISTOTLE'SETHICS
239 n.7 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
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ability to compare and distinguish precedents. Reason plays a role
in each of these factors. For example, a skilled doctor's intuitions
about what certain symptoms mean will be different than the
intuitions of a first-year resident. The moral intuitions of someone
with a history of serious devotion to the problems of morality will
not be the same as the intuitions of someone who has rarely given
thought to ethical concerns. Further, we would expect the intuitions
of a wise and experienced judge about the correct legal outcome of
a difficult case to differ from the intuitions of his or her novice law
clerk. In each of these cases, not only would we expect the intuitions
of the expert to be different than those of the novice, we would also
expect, generally, those intuitions to be better.
Although the realization that intuition plays a role in our
evaluation ofincommensurable values may not seem to tell us much
about how to reason about incommensurables, it does offer one
piece of practical advice. At times when we are faced with a difficult
moral or practical choice, perhaps the most helpful action we can
take is to seek out individuals with experience, sensitivity, and a
good track record for dealing with situations of the type in question.
In sum, the metaphor of color perception highlights several
important features of reasoning about incommensurables. Such
reasoning is an interactive exercise, involving the objects under
consideration, the circumstances under which those objects are
evaluated, and the characteristics of the person engaged in
reasoning. We should expect the character(istics) of the person
engaging in the evaluation to have a large role to play in what
conclusions will be reached.
2. Recipes
Another metaphor for understanding our pursuit of correct
answers when reasoning about complex, practical choice situations
involves the notion of a recipe."5 This metaphor is an improvement
125. For a somewhat related discussion in the context ofgovernmental choices, see Lewis
A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1599 (1998) (discussing "integration

conditions" that specify how multiple values might be integrated into ATC rankings). See also
Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability,and Conceptually SequencedArgument, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1487 (1998) (discussing incommensurability of options relative to scales that
integrate multiple criteria in certain standard ways such as tradeoff rates, privileging one
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on maximizing and weighing or balancing conceptions of reasoning
about incommensurables. ATC judgments will often implicitly rely
on underlying recipes, theories, stories, myths, utopian visions,
intuitions, or beliefs about which values should be combined in
what proportions to achieve an ideal of the type under
consideration. 6 Thus, just as baking a good cake will not be a
matter of putting in as much of each ingredient as possible,
reaching anATC judgment will involve not an attempt to maximize
as many of the relevant values as possible, but rather will involve
an effort to find or fashion a solution that will result in the proper
mixture of values in the proper quantities. There may also be
analogies to matters of timing and technique that are relevant to
following a recipe."
For example, whenwe compare two social arrangements, we have
before us a complex combination of a variety of values in a variety
of quantities and ratios. If we conclude that social arrangement Q
has more liberty, and social arrangement R has more equality, we
can still speak of an advantageous tradeoff, ATC, if the recipe of
values, including, but not limited to liberty and equality, is better
in one of the social arrangements. When we do this, however, we
are testing the two options, Q and R, against some conceptual
recipe ofwhat constitutes an ideal social arrangement.s When the
two options are compared with this recipe we may be able to make
a judgment about which is better, ATC. This recipe becomes the
criteria over others, and lexically ordering criteria).
126. Fora complementary account ofpractical reason, see Taylor, supranote 59, at 182-83
("The view that I have been advancing is that we have potentially rich resources at our
disposal to help us in such decisions [involving incommensurable goods]-ones that have
tended to be ignored by modern moral philosophy. These include not only the articulation of
goods and a sense of their relative importance, but also our sense of the shape of our lives,
and how different goods fit together within it-their different places and times.").
127.
But even if we see a plurality of final ends of equal rank, we still have to live
them; that is, we have to design a life in which they can be somehow integrated,
in some proportions, since any life is finite and cannot admit of unlimited
pursuit of any good. This sense of a life-or design or plan, if we want to
emphasize our powers of leading here-is necessarily one.
Id. at 183.
128. This ideal need notbe universal orutopian. Itmaybe quite particularto the situation
inwhich one finds oneself. The word"ideal" may be misleading ifit suggests a very high level
of abstraction or universal superiority. It may be less misleading to call the "recipe" a
conception of the best possible outcome given the contingencies of a situation.
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coin according to which P and Q are compared. And the more
confidence we have in the composition of our recipe, the better
equipped we are to make judgments about which option is better.
Our claim, however, will not be that Q is superior to R simply, but
rather that Q is superior29to R, ATC, given some particular recipe for
an ideal ATC outcome.'
We can, of course, also reason about the composition of the recipe
that we are using as the standard for an ATC judgment. When we
do this, however, we will have to take some other value as a given
for that piece of practical deliberation. For example, we might say
this recipe for an ideal community is deficient because it restricts
freedom more than another available alternative recipe. This may
be a compelling argument against the first recipe, but only if we are
right about the value of freedom, the coin of measurement for that
piece of practical deliberation. For any practical deliberation,
something will be taken as given, although that given can always
be subject to subsequent evaluations.
3. Chains and Cables
A fourth helpful metaphor for reasoning about incommensurables
is found in the distinction C. S. Pierce draws between a chain and
a cable. Pierce argues that philosophy ought
to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments
than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not
form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a
cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided
they are
30
sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.
129. Ronald Dworkin's ideal of law as integrity is an example of a recipe approach to
adjudication. Dworkin posits two values, "fit" and "justification," realizes that it is not
possible to maximize both, and suggests a recipe approach. To oversimplify, "fit" is
backwards-looking and asks whether a proposed judicial choice has fidelity with what has
come before; 'justification," on the other hand, is a forward-looking value judgment about
which option is best. As between two judicial choices, each of which satisfies some
(unspecified) threshold of fit, the option that provides the best 'justification" should be
selected. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 4. One weakness in Dworkin's account is that
there is an insufficient explanation of what it takes for an option to have the requisite
amount of "fit." In other words, the appropriate recipe of fit and justification is insufficiently
identified.
130. CHARLES SANDERS PIERCE, 5 COLLECTED PAPERS 157 (Charles Hartshome & Paul
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Rather than constructing arguments that resemble chains, we will
generally be more successful if our evaluations involve the
consideration ofamultitude of related reasons and components that
can be woven into a cable of cumulative strength.
Practical reasoningis a social practice that is committed to giving
and defending reasons to justify and explain choices. Particular
outcomes are defended and criticized on the basis of these reasons.
The persuasiveness and import of reasons are in turn evaluated in
terms of other values that are important. When making personal
choices, convincing yourself may be sufficient, whereas in other
contexts convincing others will also be important."l '
This commitment to reason giving extends into the public realm
and has implications for adjudication.3 2 As a social practice,
adjudication is noteworthy for-and in fact may be defined by-its
commitment to reason giving. The appellate judicial opinion is an
extended argument that seeks to justify a conclusion, through
reasons that will be found convincing. The reasons given are subject
to scrutiny, by the parties, by other judges in dissenting and
subsequent opinions, by academics, and others. We routinely speak
of judicial conclusions being correct or incorrect. By this we mean
that the reasons that were, or that could have been, marshaled on
behalf of a particular outcome are or are not more compelling than
the reasons that were, or that could have been, marshaled on behalf
of the alternatives. 33

Weiss eds., 1934).
131. Arelated defense oflegal reasoning involving strands rather than chains can be seen
in Cass Sunstein's defense of "incompletely theorized agreements" in behalf of particular
legal outcomes. See SUNSTEINLEGALRESONINGANDPOLITICALCONFICT, supranote 5, at

35-61; Sunstein, Incompletely TheorizedAgreements, supra note 5.
132. See STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERALViRTUEs: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COmMIIfITY IN
LIBERAL CONSTrrUTIONALISM 40 (1990) ("The conviction that other people should be treated
reasonably, that the application of power should be accompanied by conscientious and open
efforts to meet objections with reasons, is an important source of sustenance for liberal
constitutionalism. This aspiration to public reasonableness helps explain and justify our
commitment to the rule of law and to judicial review.. ").
133. See id. at 46 ("At the most basic level public justification has dual aims: it seems
reflective justification (good reasons) but it also seeks reasons that can be widely seen to be
good by persons such as they are .... Public justification does not work down from a prior,
purely philosophical standard, participants aim at a system of principles that all can see to
be reasonable (not one that only a few will regard as true or best.")) (citation omitted).
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4. PracticalWisdom and Craft
The best account of how we reason about incommensurable
values is provided by Aristotle. The central idea of his practical
philosophy is that it is possible to reach definite conclusions about
what is right in specific cases without a universal theory. This
conception of practical rationality stands in contrast to theories
that attempt to establish scientific or axiomatic rule systems
for determining how to act. As David Wiggins explains, a neoAristotelian approach to practical reasoning will recognize that,
because values are plural and incommensurable, any theory that
attempts to recapitulate or reconstruct practical reasoning must
give up on the attempt to "treat the concerns which an agent brings
to any situation as forming a closed, complete, consistent system. " ""
Relevant considerations in practical choice situations make
competing inconsistent claims on us. This, Wiggins argues, "is a
mark not of irrationality but of rationality in the face of the
plurality of ends and the plurality of human goods."" 5 Wiggins
questions the superiority of an axiom system for guiding practical
rationality, as compared to a "long and incomplete or open-ended
3 6 There is,
list of (always at the limit conflicting) desiderata?"
Wiggins suggests, no reason to think that all moral concerns are
reconcilable. Therefore, because moral concerns are plural and
conflicting, we cannot expect to "lay down a decision procedure" for
adjudicating in advance their competing claims.' Because of the
plurality of values, there is "no real prospect of an ordinary
scientific or simply empirical theory of all of action and deliberation
as such."' Instead, we should be looking for what Aristotle
provides---"namely, a conceptual framework which we can apply to
particular cases, which articulates the reciprocal relations of an
agent's concerns and his perception of how things objectively are in
the world.""3 9

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Wiggins, supra note 124, at 233.
Id.
Id. at 239 n.8.
Id
Id. at 237.
Id.
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A full account of practical wisdom and how it relates to reasoning
about incommensurables and to adjudication is beyond the scope of
this Article. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to identify several
important features of Aristotle's account of practical wisdom
and the implications of those features for reasoning about
incommensurable values.
a. Virtues of Intellect and Character
Perhaps the most important, or at least the most distinctive,
feature of Aristotle's views about practical wisdom is his belief that
achieving good outcomes, in intellectual or moral life, is a result not
only of intellect, but also of virtue. Aristotle distinguishes between
intellectual virtues and virtues of character.' An ability to excel at
theoretical reasoning, for example, depends upon intellectual
virtue. Intellectual excellence can exist in a person with a defective
character and does not depend primarily on life experience. 141 Thus,
we are familiar with evil geniuses, as well as extraordinarily young
proteges who exhibit intellectual capabilities far beyond what we
would expect of someone their age. Virtues of character, which
Aristotle defines as habits that are developed through practice and
discipline over time,
in contrast, do not appear in fully developed
1 42
form in the young.

Practical wisdom is unique among virtues in that it involves both
intellect and character. It is difficult to exaggerate either the
importance of this insight to Aristotle's understanding of practical
wisdom, or how anachronistic this conviction will seem to many in
our day and age.'
What virtues in particular are involved in reasoning well about
complex and conflicting values? Aristotle's answer is obscure.
Anthony Kronman has argued persuasively that the two primary
virtues of character that are relevant to practical reason are
sympathy and detachment. 44 Sympathy enables us to examine each
140. See KRoNMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, supra note 69, at 41-44.

141. See id.
142. See id. at 41.
143. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 69 (arguing that statutory interpretation
is grounded upon practical reason, but silent about relevance of virtue).
144. See KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, supranote 69, at 66-74.
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competing alternative in its best possible light; to treat it seriously;
to see and feel its appeal in a real (if imaginary) way.145 The ability
to be detached allows us to move back and forth between
alternatives, and to keep enough emotional distance so that we will
not exaggerate the merits of a particular viewpoint because we are
146
attached to it.
Sympathy and detachment are closely related to another element
of character, what Kronman calls deliberative imagination, each of
which is relevant to adjudication.' 1 As Kronman puts it:
Deliberative imagination is the capacity to entertain a point of
view defined by interests, attitudes, and values different from
one's own without actually endorsing it. Every deliberative
process in which a choice must be made among alternatives
that cannot be arranged in a clear rank order of better and
worse demands imagination in this sense. That is true whether
the choice in question is first-personal (a choice concerning the
direction and content of one's own life), third-personal (a choice
that must be made by someone else, whom one is helping to
advise), or adjudicative (where the point of deliberating is to
choose among the conflicting claims of other persons). In each
case deliberation requires a combination of sympathy and
145.
As I review the alternatives before me, I must attempt to feel with each of the
selves I might become the special cares and commitments, attachments and
aversions, that give the life of that possible future self its own distinctive shape.
I must strain to feel the force of those internal norms that are the source of
whatever appeal that life possesses, and make an effort to see the values
associated with it in their most appealing light, which means from the point of
view of one actually committed to them.
Id. at 70.
146.
A person who is faced, let us say, with a difficult choice between two careers
must make an effort to see the claims of each in its best light and to feel for
himself their power and appeal. At the same time, he must preserve a certain
distance or detachment from them. From each imaginative foray into the
possible future lives that his choices represent, he must be able to withdraw to
the standpoint of decision, the position he occupies at present.... To ensure
that he remains sufficiently detached to surveythe alternatives from avantage
point different from any of their own internal points of view, itis necessary that
he hold something in reserve even while making a maximum effort at
sympathetic understanding.
Id at 72.
147. See id. at 325-31.
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detachment, those who lack these traits
will display a
148
characteristic deficiency of imagination.
b. Ends and Means
Aristotle stated that we do not deliberate about ends, but only
about means.'49 In other words, practical reason consists of positing
an end and marshaling the best reasons in support of it, and then
positing an alternative end and marshaling the best reasons in
support of that end. We cannot characterize a choice without
reference to both the ends and the means. As Sarah Brodie has
pointed out, choice involves a three-term relation of an agent, ends,
and means. 50 As a result, we do not just evaluate acts, but also
choices and the relationship between the agent, the means, and the
end.
Some have mistaken Aristotle's doctrine of means and ends for
a belief that reason has nothing to do with the determination of
ends, but only with the calculation of how best to achieve ends that
are selected on a basis other than reason.' 5 ' This almost certainly
misconstrues Aristotle's views.'5 2 There is no reason why the end
that is posited for one practical deliberation cannot then be the
subject of analysis on another occasion. Thus, to cite one of
Aristotle's examples, although a doctor will not question whether to
pursue health when acting as a doctor; it is possible for that doctor
on another occasion to question whether health is an appropriate
53
pursuit.
Legal realism makes a similar mistake. Realists often assert that
judges choose outcomes based on extralegal considerations and then
148. Id. at 326-27; see also Scharffs, supra note *.
149. See SARAH BRODIE, ETHIcs WrrH ARISToTLE 179-260 (1991) (analyzing Aristotle's

discussion of practical wisdom); Wiggins, supra note 124, at 225.
150. See BRODIE, supranote 149, at 179-80.
151. Some commentators have suggested that Aristotle's distinction between virtues of
character and intellect correspond with the ends/means dichotomy, with our character
determining the ends we pursue and our intellect determining the best way to accomplish
those ends. For a refutation of this view, see Wiggins, supra note 124, at 221-40.
152. See id.; see also Wiggins, supranote 62, at 62 ("For an Aristotelian, the idea that a
self-contained part of the concept of rationality can be bitten off and studied in value-free
fashion as the rationality of means, leaving the rest, that is ends, to the taste or formation
of individual agents, is a delusion, and a gratuitous delusion at that.").
153. See Wiggins, supranote 124, at 225-27.
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construct justifications or rationalizations to explain orjustify their

choices." This does not seem to be an accurate characterization of
most appellate adjudication. 55 It is true that a judge will posit an
outcome (or end) and consider the best reason (or means) that can
be marshaled on behalf of that outcome, but judges (at least when
they are acting as judges, and we have reason to believe that most
of them usually are) will also consider alternative outcomes and the
best reasons that would justify each ofthe outcomes. A choice is not
made until the various alternatives, which can be analyzed only
when ends and means are evaluated together, are each considered
and the judge reaches a conclusion that one of the available options
is supported
by better or more persuasive reasons than the other
1 56
options.

Thus, adjudication is not an activity that usually consists of
making a choice and then doing one's best to justify that choice. It
is more akin to hypothesis-testing, subjecting various possible
outcomes, or hypotheses, to the scrutiny of the various relevant
arguments for and against, and then settling upon the outcome that
is best supported by the available evidence.
c. Choice
Practical reason recognizes the reality of choice in situations of
practical deliberation.157 If monism is correct that there is only one
value that ultimately matters, then rationality will compel a
practical decision maker to seek and choose the option that will
154. For example, Robert J. Martineau argues that "[uin understanding the significance
of the appellate court opinion in the statutory construction process, the most crucial
distinction is between the making of the decision by the judges on the panel to affirm or
reverse, and the reasoned explanation of the decision given in the written opinion." Robert
J. Martineau, Craft and Technique,Not Canonsand GrandTheories:A Neo-Realist View of
Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 26 (1993). The written opinion is "a
reasoned justification of the decision prepared after the decision is made. The principal
purpose of the opinion is to make the decision appear consistent with the facts and the
relevant statutory and judicial authority." Id. at 27.
155. See KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, supranote 69, at 211-25.
156. See id. at 325-42.
157. Thus, practicalreasonrejects the view, usually associatedwith Langdell, thatthe law
is a choiceless science akin to geometry. See id. at 170 (discussing Langdell's geometry of
law); CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAw OF CoNTRACTS (1871);
CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1880).
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realize the most of that value. From this view, practical reason is
entirely a matter of calculation. There will be no reasons to
commend any other course of action over the one that maximizes
the value that truly matters. Making any other choice will be
irrational and will reflect either weakness of will, mental error, or
a deliberate choice to do the wrong thing.
Practical reason rejects the view that moral decision making
consists of rational agents seeking to maximize some good or
package of goods." Instead, "The judgment that one course of
action is better than another is arrived at... [through] the agent's
preexisting conception (constantly informed and reshaped by
circumstance) of the life that is good for a man to attempt to
realize." 59
As a result, practical reason recognizes the reality of choice in a
way that monism cannot. Choice may reflect our commitment to a
particular recipe of values; may reflect a considered judgment about
what kind of person we want to become; and may involve a belief
made is correct, or the best available under the
that the choice
1 6
circumstances. 1
To say that judges have choices is in one sense uncontroversial;
judges rarely are faced with only one alternative. To say judges
have choice, however, is not to deny the distinction between
following the law and legislating from the bench, nor that some
choices are correct and others incorrect.' 6 1 Judges can and
sometimbs do exercise their discretion of choice poorly.
Occasionally, judges will make a self-conscious choice not to follow
the law, and can be fairly accused of legislating from the bench.
Often, however, such choices can more accurately be characterized
as situations in which a judge (perhaps mistakenly) finds more
persuasive reasons that argue against implementing the plain
the reasons
textual meaning, intent, or purposes of a statute than
62
that argue in favor of vindicating a statutory text.
158. See Wiggins, supranote 124, at 22140.
159. David Wiggins, Weakness of Will Commensurability,and the Objects of Deliberation
and Desire, in ESSAYS ON AmIS2oTLE'S ETHIcS, supranote 124, at 241, 261. This emphasis
on the agent's conception of the good partially accounts for the large place reserved for

character and disposition in Aristotle's ethical framework
160. See Wiggins, supra note 124, at 221-40.
161. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH (1962).

162. Judges that do not adhere to the express or probable directives of legislatures when
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d. Creativity
Practical reasoning is a creative enterprise. Given that practical
deliberation and choice does not involve the application of a single
rule, or even a complex system of rules, it will be creative in
nature. 163 Determining which considerations are relevant;
analogizing precedents; attempting to envision the likely effects of
various outcomes; organizing and presenting relevant reasons in
such a way that they are persuasive (to ourselves or to relevant
others) are all skills that take a great degree of creativity.
Adjudication, likewise, is a creative process. Multiple
considerations and reasons compete for a judge's devotion. A judge
will have to determine which among various arguments are most
compelling; how precedents will be considered and applied; what
analogies will be made; and the effect of the decision as a future
precedent.1 In short, reasons will be marshaled on behalf of
possible conclusions.
e. Craft
Aristotle contrasts practical reason with craft. Judicial decision
making actually combines features of both Aristotelean practical
wisdom and craft. Insights from Aristotle's discussion of craft are
quite apropos of judicial decision making.
Anthony Kronman draws upon the Aristotelean concept of craft.
Kronman describes the once widely held, now largely forgotten,
"idea that the law is a craft demanding a cultivated subtlety of
judgment whose possession constitutes avaluable trait of character,
as distinct from mere technical skill, and which therefore justifies
the special sort of pride that the possession of such a trait
affords."1 65 What makes a carpenter a craftsman, as distinct from

interpreting statutes are often guilty ofdisregarding or failing to give their due to powerful
arguments based upon democratic theory and sources of authority. See, e.g., id. (expounding
upon the countermajoritarian difficulty).
163. See Wiggins, supra note 124, at 221-40.
164. See KIoNuAN, THE LOST LAwYER, supra note 69, at 213, 315-28.
165. Id. at 295.
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someone who happens to get something right, is the craftsman's
knowledge of what he is doing and why he takes each step.
Kronman's description of the law, particularly the work ofjudges,
as a craft draws heavily on Karl Llewellyn's analysis of appellate
judging in his monumental work, The Common Law Tradition:
DecidingAppeals.In response to the insufficiency of conceptions of
law as a self-contained set of rules, Kronman writes:
Llewellyn's answer is that judges are constrained not only by
doctrinal rules but also, and more importantly, by specific
traditions of work and by the habits of thought and perception
that an immersion in these traditions typically produces .... No
matter how many choices the rules leave open, a judge whose
task is to apply the law will be guided in his deliberations by
what might be called the ethos of his office, by a certain ideal of
judicial craftsmanship, and by the habits that a devotion to this
ideal and long experience in attempting to achieve it tend to

instill. 66

166. Id. at 213-14. As LIewellyn put it[B]asic to most of both the misconceptions and the cross-purposings of the
realist controversy, was an absence everywhere of the concept of craft, of
craft-tradition, of craft-responsibility, and of craftsmanship not as meaning
merely the high artistry of God's gifted, but as including the uninspired but
reliable work of the plain and ordinary citizen of the craft. The existence of a
craft means the existence of some significant body of working knowhow,
centered on the doing of some perceptible kind ofjob. This working knowhow
is in some material degree transmissible and transmitted to the incomer, it is
in some material degree conscious, it is to some degree articulate in principles
and rules of art or of thumb, in practices and dodges or contrivances which can
be noticed and learned for the easing and the furtherance of the work. A
healthy craft, moreover, elicits ideals, pride, and responsibility in its craftsmen.
And every live craft has much more to it than any rules describe; the rules not
only fail to tell the full tale, taken literally they tell much of it wrong; and while
words can set forth such facts andneeds as ideals, craft-conscience, and morale,
these things are bodied forth, they live and work, primarily in ways and
attitudes which are much more and better felt and done than they are said.
Now appellate judging is a distinct and (along with spokesmanship) a central
craft of the law side of the great-institution of Law-Government. Every aspect
of the work and of the man at work is informed and infiltrated by the craft. It
is a tough craft, too; over a whole era it has survived a drift away into
formalistic thinking and even believing. More, it has then also survived a
degree of neglect of its conscious philosophy which could have choked a less
hardy plant, and which remains a peril in the current crisis.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, TnE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDiNG APPEAL3 214 (1960).
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D. ATC Judgments Revisited
It may be helpful to gather together the threads of my argument.
I have suggested that we can make rational comparisons in complex
choice situations involving options that reflect plural and conflicting
values. The problems of incommensurability are often exaggerated
because of imprecise use of terminology and the confusion of
importantly different concepts, such as incommensurability and
incomparability. I have also suggested that needlessly pessimistic
assessments of reason's abilities to provide guidance in practical
choice situations are often based upon an obsession with ATC
judgments. I have identified alternatives to ATC judgments, and
have sought to clarify what an ATC claim really entails.
I have also argued that even ATC judgments can be meaningfully
made and rationally defended. I have suggested several metaphors
that help us understand what is involved in deliberation and choice.
Using the metaphor of color perception, I suggested that such
judgments are anthropocentric, objective, and relative, and that,
just as perception plays a role in our evaluation of colors, intuition
plays a role in moral judgments. Using the metaphor of underlying
recipes, I suggested that reaching ATC conclusions may not be a
matter of maximizing one value, or even a list of values. We can
evaluate competing alternatives against a complex recipe. We can
also evaluate competing recipes in terms of other criteria, although
there is no ultimate ground on which we can rest a proof that one
recipe is better than all others. Using the metaphor of the cable and
chain, I suggested that reasoning about incommensurables
resembles the accumulation of mutually-reinforcing strands, rather
than the construction of a logical chain based on deductions or
67
calculations of a single value.'
How then will a neo-Aristotelian conception of practical reason
answer the question: "Which is the best alternative in this
situation, ATC?" The answer will not be entirely satisfying,
especially when answered with a high degree of generality. It is:
167. See Taylor, supranote 59, at 183 ("Real ethical life is inescapably led between the one
and the many. We cannot do away either with the diversity of goods (or at least so I would
argue against modem moral theory) or with the aspiration to oneness implicit in our leading
our lives. I would argue that Aristotle knew this, and it is another one of those basic insights
of his that we moderns have spend too much time forgetting.") (footnote omitted).
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"This course of action is superior to all the alternatives because the
reasons supporting it are more compelling than the reasons
supporting any other alternative."16 '
The protests will be immediate and vociferous: This answer
merely begs the question! What will count as a better reason,
especially if values are incommensurable? This question is not
without an answer, which this Article attempts to provide, although
that answer in turn will be deemed by some to be insufficient
because it does not provide an axiom system to verify that our
results are correct.
Once the reasons for and against a particular practical choice are
explained in a persuasive and coherent way, there will often be a
high degree of agreement that one outcome is correct. Even when
a consensus does not exist, it may develop over time. What counts
as a persuasive reason, of course, will depend upon a community of
listeners who share enough beliefs and commitments that
particular reasons will be mutually recognized as having force
(although there need not be exact agreement about the relative
force of each reason).' 69
168. David Wiggins' conclusions about what it means to be rational are similar.
[RIationality in an agent is the disposition, episodically exercised (and
occasionally no doubt not exercised), to prefer (and to persist in the preference
for) an act or a belief or an attitude in the light of the standards of evaluation
and normative ends and ideals that it is the substantive work of evidential,
axiological, moral, and whatever other reflection to determine. The rich fabric
of reason and reasonableness is not to be confected from the thin threads of
plain consistency, or from any elaboration of such materials.... It is the
existence of such knowledge that makes it possible, as Aristotle puts it, for the
decision to lie in perception, that is, for the decision to depend on the exercise
ofjudgment in confrontation with some actually given particular situation....
Wiggins, supranote 64, at 65.
169.
What then, with regard to reason and rationality and reasonableness, is the
business ofphilosophy? Surely, to participate in the critique ofrea'sons, and to
do so in a manner at once participatively engaged yet alert to the need to step
off the treadmill, to stand back or to lower the level of optical resolution and
look harder in search of scale, shape, and outline. The standards of
reasonableness that philosophy can articulate from the critique of lived
experience, or by reflection upon the claims that each value makes upon
thought, feeling and appetition, will be a distillation from practical knowledge,
knowledge not exhaustdby the verbalized generalizations orprecepts ofeither
agent or theorist.
Wiggins, supra note 64, at 65. 1 would add that the role of law professors in critiquing the
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Being correct in practical matters is not, however, merely a
matter of convincing the most people. One reason is because
practical wisdom-the ability to reason well about practical
matters-is neither a universally shared, nor equally developed
virtue of intellect or character. Thus, it is not enough to say that an
outcome is correct because it has marshaled majority support."0
Our practical judgments must, therefore, remain somewhat
tentative. The possibility that better reasons will come to light that
cause us to reassess our conclusions must remain open. A
commitment to practical reason entails a commitment to ongoing,
though not incessant, assessment of our convictions and subjection
of our judgments, choices, and reasons to the light of new
circumstances and new information, experience, and arguments.
What if practical reason still seems woefully inadequate and
indeterminate? We would do well to recall Isaiah Berlin's
denunciation of "[slingle-minded monists, ruthless fanatics, men
possessed by an all-embracing coherent vision," who are unable to
"know the doubts and agonies of those who cannot wholly blind
themselves to reality." 7 1 After all, what reason do we have to expect
more out of an ethical theory of rationality? David Wiggins
powerfully makes the point:
I entertain the unfriendly suspicion that those who feel they
must seek more than all this provides want a scientific theory
of rationality not so much from a passion for science, even
where there can be no real science, but because they hope and
desire, by some conceptual alchemy, to turn such a theory into
a regulative or normative discipline, or into a system of rules by
which to spare themselves some of the torment of thinking,
feeling and understanding that can actually be involved in
reasoned deliberation.'7 2

work of judges could be almost identically described.
170. See PoSNERsupranote 69, at 113 ("To equate truth with consensus would imply that
the earth once was flat, and now is round; that the sun used to revolve around the earth but
now the earth revolves around the sun.").
171. BERLIN, supra note 46, at 1v.
172. Wiggins, supranote 124, at 237; see also POSNER,supranote 69, at 73 ("Miscellaneous
and unrigorous it may be, but practical reason is our principal set of tools for answering
questions large and small. Maybe our only set.").
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CONCLUSION: REASONING ABOUT INCOMMENSURABLES

In this Article, I have attempted to walk a path that rejects the
romantic view that reason is anemic and weak in the face of plural
and conflicting values, as well as the totalitarian conception of
reason as offering an axiomatic method for maximizing a single
supreme value, or weighing and balancing multiple values. Rather,
I have tried to articulate and defend a conception of practical reason
that enables us not only to reason meaningfully about incommensurable values, but also to engage in ATC judgments that can
rationally be defended as better or worse than alternatives.
We should not expect convergence regarding important practical
questions; this is because, in part, the things we care most deeply
about are different, and the values they manifest are incommensurable.
Confronted with plural and conflicting values, and the accompanying problems of incommensurability, pessimism about
reason's gifts is an understandable, if misguided, response. The
intractability of practical difficulties, the cacophony of competing
voices, the variety of our points of view and life'experiences, and the
shrillness of much of what passes as public discourse, contribute to
our sense of hopelessness and helplessness. The temptation to
reduce public reason giving and justification, including adjudication, to politics is seductive.
We must not be seduced however. Concluding that reason is
helpless in the face ofincommensurable values is not only romantic,
it is also mistaken. Reason can and does guide practical
deliberation and choice, and we do not necessarily act in error when
we consider some alternatives, and the reasons that support them,
better than others.

